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 The long-term nature of many environmental problems, such as climate change, makes understanding
the evolution of technology an important part of projecting future impacts.  Moreover, in many cases
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Within the field of environmental economics, the role of technological change has 
received much attention (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2003). The long term nature of many 
environmental problems, such as climate change, makes understanding the evolution of 
technology an important part of projecting future policy impacts.  Environmental technologies 
include technologies that reduce pollution at the end of the pipe, such as scrubbers for use on 
industrial smokestacks or catalytic converters for automobiles.  They also include changes to the 
production process, such as improved energy efficiency, that lead to reduced environmental 
impacts.  Because the benefits of environmental technologies tend to accrue to society at large, 
rather than the adopter of such technologies, market forces alone provide little incentive for 
developing environmental technologies.  Instead, environmental regulation or public funding of 
research and development (R&D) often provides the first impetus for developing new 
environmental technologies.  These induced effects of environmental policy on technology may 
have substantial implications for the normative analysis of policy decisions.  Indeed, in many 
cases, environmental problems cannot be addressed, or can only be addressed at great cost, using 
existing technologies.  As a result, understanding the interactions between environmental policy 
and technology may have quantitatively important consequences in the context of cost-benefit or 
cost-effectiveness analyses of such policies.   
Understanding the environmental impact of overall technological change is also 
important to assess the long-term sustainability of economic growth.  The environmental impact 
of economic activity is profoundly affected by the rate and direction of technological change.  
Costs tend to fall, quality tends to improve, and a wider variety of technologies tend to become 
available as time passes.  New technologies may create or facilitate increased pollution, or may 
mitigate or replace existing polluting activities.  Further, because many environmental problems 
and policy responses are evaluated over time horizons of decades or centuries, the cumulative 
impact of technological changes is likely to be large. Indeed, uncertainty about the future rate 
and direction of technological change is often an important sensitivity in forecasts of the severity 
of environmental problems.   
This is best illustrated by the example of climate change, in which different assumptions 
about the potential for future technological change lead to greatly different assessments about 
both the potential for reducing carbon emissions and the optimal rate at which such reductions 
should occur.  For instance, in its latest report on climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) reports estimates of the costs of stabilizing global carbon concentrations 
from a variety of climate models.  To stabilize concentrations at a level of 550 parts per million 
(ppm), the estimated costs, in terms of lost GDP in the year 2050, range from a four percent loss 
to a slight increase in GDP, relative to baseline growth (IPCC 2007).  Projections of future 
technological change are an important driver of these differences, and affect not only the cost of 
reducing emissions, but also predictions of what emissions levels will occur in the absence of 
climate policy initiatives.  
This chapter reviews the literature on technological change and the environment.  This is 
a large task, inevitably requiring unfortunate but necessary omissions.  In particular, we confine 
ourselves to the relationship between technology and problems of environmental pollution, 
leaving aside a large literature on technological change in agriculture and natural resources more 
broadly.  Because of the significant environmental implications of fossil fuel combustion, we 
include in our review some of the relevant literature on technological change and energy use, 2 
 
with a focus on the environmental impacts of energy use.  Our goals in this chapter are to both 
introduce technological change economists to how lessons from the study of technological 
change have been applied in the field of environmental economics, and to suggest ways in which 





2.1. Fundamentals of Environmental Economics 
Economic analysis of environmental policy is based on the idea that the potentially 
harmful consequences of economic activities on the environment constitute an “externality,” an 
economically significant effect of an activity, the consequences of which are borne (at least in 
part) by a party or parties other than the party that controls the externality-producing activity. A 
factory that pollutes the air, water, or land imposes a cost on society. The firm that owns the 
factory has an economic incentive to use only as much labor or steel as it can productively 
employ, because those inputs are costly to the firm. The cost to society of having some of its 
labor and steel used up in a given factory is internalized by the firm, because it has to pay for 
those inputs. But the firm does not have an economic incentive to minimize the external costs of 
pollution.  
Environmental policies attempt to equalize this imbalance by raising the incentive for a 
firm to minimize these externalities. Policy choices accomplish this in one of two general 
ways—either by financially internalizing the environmental costs so polluters make their own 
decisions regarding their consumption of environmental inputs, or by imposing a limit on the 
level of environmental pollution. 
The cost of environmental policies could be in the form of decreased output of desired 
products (for example, a scrubber on an electric power plant reduces its electricity production 
from a given quantity of fuel), increased use of other variable inputs (for example, eliminating 
certain gases from the waste stream in a smokestack may require more fuel to be burned and 
require additional labor to maintain pollution control equipment), purchase of specialized 
pollution control equipment (for example, catalytic converters on automobiles), or substitution of 
inferior or more expensive products or production methods to avoid pollution-causing products 
or methods (for example, less effective pesticides used when DDT was banned). 
In the short run, setting an efficient environmental policy requires a comparison of the 
marginal cost of reducing pollution with the marginal benefit of a cleaner environment. All else 
being equal, emissions of pollutants that are very harmful should be greatly restricted, because 
the pollutants otherwise produce large marginal costs to society. But, all else being equal, 
emissions of pollutants that are very costly to eliminate should be tolerated, because the marginal 
cost of reducing them is high.  
When technology enters the equation, the terms of the tradeoff between the marginal cost 
of pollution control and its marginal social benefit is altered. In particular, technology 
innovations—such as new pollution control equipment, cleaner production methods, or new 
substitutes for environmentally harmful products—typically reduce the marginal cost of 
                                                 
1 This section draws considerably from Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2005). 3 
 
achieving a given unit of pollution reduction. These innovations may also change the shape or 
the slope of these marginal costs.  In most cases, technological change enables a specified level 
of environmental cleanup to be achieved at lower total cost to society. New innovations also 
make it possible for a lower total level of pollution to be attained more efficiently than would be 
expected if the cost of cleanup were higher. 
The ability of technology to lower environmental cleanup costs has influenced much 
research in environmental economics.  Initially, these questions focused on the ability of 
environmental policy to shape the direction of technological change.  In the absence of 
environmental policy, firms have little incentive to install cleaner technologies or develop better 
environmental technologies for future use.
2  This can lead early, pre-policy predictions of the net 
benefits of environmental regulation to be lower than evaluations after the fact, as newly 
developed technologies lower the costs of complying with regulation (Harrington et al. 2000).  
More recently, environmental economists have paid increasing attention to estimating the rate at 
which technology improves, as well as the role of technology policy itself to supplement the 
effects of environmental policy.   
 
2.2. The Economics of Technological Change 
As environmental economic research on technological change has grown, the importance 
of considering market failures for knowledge, as well as traditional environmental externalities, 
has been emphasized.  In particular, calls for increased government support for environmentally-
friendly R&D are motivated by the need to overcome such market failures.  As these should be 
familiar to technological change scholars, we only briefly mention these here, with an emphasis 
on the importance of these lessons for environmental models.   
The generation of knowledge through the innovative process contrasts sharply with the 
negative externalities from pollution.  Because of the public goods nature of knowledge, a firm 
that invests in or implements a new technology typically creates benefits for others while 
incurring all the costs. The firm therefore lacks the incentive to increase those benefits by 
investing in technology. Pollution creates a negative externality, and so the invisible hand allows 
too much of it. Technology creates positive externalities, and so the invisible hand produces too 
little of it.  As such, even if policies to correct the environmental externalities are in place, the 
level of environmental R&D will still be suboptimal.  Because they ignore the positive spillovers 
created by R&D, firms will underinvest in research activity.   
Uncertainty is also an issue for innovation. While all investment is characterized by 
uncertainty, the uncertainty associated with the returns to investment in innovation is often 
particularly large.  Not only is the variance of the distribution of expected returns much larger 
than for other investments, but much or even most of the value may be associated with very low-
                                                 
2 The assumption here, and through much of the literature on environmental innovation, is that any resulting 
environmental benefits are a pure public good.  Exceptions occur when the benefits are impure public goods, in 
which some, but not all, of the benefits of the good go to the user of technology.  An example is energy efficiency 
improvements, for which there is an incentive even absent direct environmental policy, due to the positive price of 
energy. However, as reducing energy consumption also benefits the environment through lower production, energy 
prices themselves will not encourage efficient usage and development of energy efficiency technologies unless the 
associated environmental externalities have been fully priced.   4 
 
probability but very high value outcomes (Scherer et al. 2000).  Uncertainty may prove 
particulary problematic for environmental policy, as the technologies needed to comply with 
propsed regulations may evolve in unexpected ways once policy is in place, making it difficult 
for regulators to anticipate the true costs of compliance.   
More recently, economists have come to understand additional market failures that may 
operate in the adoption and diffusion of new technology. For a number of reasons, the cost or 
value of a new technology to one user may depend on how many other users have adopted the 
technology. In general, users will be better off the more other people use the same technology. 
This benefit associated with the overall scale of technology adoption has sometimes been 
referred to as “dynamic increasing returns,” which may be generated by learning-by-using, 
learning-by-doing, or network externalities.   Thus, just like the creation of the technology itself, 
information about the performance of a technology has an important public goods component. 
Finally, adoption of new technologies may be hindered by principal-agent problems, as 
when a builder or landlord chooses the level of investment in energy efficiency in a building, but 
the energy bills are paid by a later purchaser or a tenant. If the purchaser has incomplete 
information about the magnitude of the resulting energy savings, the builder or landlord may not 
be able to recover the cost of such investments, and hence might not undertake them. These 
market failures with respect to adoption of new technology are part of the explanation for the 
apparent “paradox” of underinvestment in energy-saving technologies that appear cost-effective 
but are not widely utilized (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins 2004; Gillingham, 
Newell, and Palmer 2009). 
 
2.3 Implications for Environmental and Technology Policy 
The combination of environmental externalities and knowledge market failures provide 
two hurdles for policy makers to address when providing incentives for environmental 
innovation, and suggests two possible avenues through which policy can encourage the 
development of environmentally-friendly technologies: correcting the environmental externality 
and/or correcting knowledge market failures.  At a minimum, effective long-run environmental 
policies require both.  Because knowledge market failures apply generally across technologies, 
policies addressing knowledge market failures may be general, addressing the problem in the 
economy as a whole, such as patent protection, R&D tax credits, and funding for generic basic 
research. Such policies focus on the overall rate of innovation – how much innovative activity 
takes place.  In contrast, policies aimed specifically at the environment focus on the direction of 
innovation.  While this includes policies regulating externalities, such as a carbon tax or cap-and-
trade system, it also includes environmental and energy policies using more general R&D policy 
mechanisms with a specific focus on the environment.  Technology policies specific to energy 
include targeted government subsidies for adoption of alternative energy, and funding for 
targeted basic and applied research.   
Studies evaluating the effectiveness of these various policy options find that 
environmental and technology policies work best in tandem.  While technology policy can help 
facilitate the creation of new environmentally-friendly technologies, it provides little incentive to 
adopt these technologies.  Fischer (2008) develops a theoretical model showing that government 
support for emissions control R&D is only effective if there is at least moderate environmental 5 
 
policy in place to encourage adoption of the resulting technologies.  Using a computable general 
equilibrium model to study the potential effects of energy R&D for climate change mitigation, 
Schneider and Goulder (1997) show that policies to address knowledge spillovers are more 
effective if they address all knowledge spillovers, rather than focusing exclusively on R&D 
pertaining to alternative energy.  Not surprisingly, technology subsidies alone have a smaller 
environmental impact than policies that directly address the environmental externality.   
Popp (2006a) considers the long-run welfare gains from both an optimally-designed 
carbon tax (one equating the marginal benefits of carbon reductions with the marginal costs of 
such reductions) and optimally designed R&D subsidies.  Popp finds that combining both 
policies yields the largest welfare gain.  However, a policy using only the carbon tax achieves 
95% of the welfare gains of the combined policy, while a policy using only the optimal R&D 
subsidy attains just 11% of the welfare gains of the combined policy in his model.  In contrast to 
Schneider and Goulder, R&D policy has less effect in this study, as the subsidies only apply to 
the energy sector.  
Given the importance of emissions policies to encourage R&D, two recent papers ask 
whether initial emissions policies should be made stronger, in order to achieve lower costs 
through an initial burst of induced innovation.  Using a growth model, Hart (2008) shows that, in 
general, it is not optimal to raise an emissions tax above the level necessary to account for the 
environmental externality.  One exception is if the shadow price of the emissions stock is rising 
and the initial level of emissions-saving knowledge is low.  In this case, the spillovers from 
emissions-savings knowledge will be more valuable than spillovers from other innovations, 
justifying a temporary increase in the optimal emissions tax to account for differences in the 
social benefits of spillovers across technologies. Presumably a targeted R&D subsidy could also 
accomplish this, and perhaps with greater efficiency.  Greaker and Pade (2008) find additional 
justification for higher emissions taxes if patent policy is weak – that is, as a second-best policy 
if the knowledge market spillover has not been adequately addressed. 
The above studies focus on the macro level, and assume that technologies, once created, 
are optimally deployed. Fischer and Newell (2008) use a micro approach to study a broader set 
of policies, including those encouraging technology adoption, to assess policies for reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions and promoting innovation and diffusion of renewable energy. They 
evaluate the relative performance of policies according to incentives provided for emissions 
reduction and economic efficiency, and also assess how the nature of technological progress (i.e., 
learning versus R&D) and the degree of knowledge spillovers, affects the desirability of different 
policies. Although the relative cost of individual policies in achieving emissions reductions 
depends on parameter values and the emissions target, in a numerical application to the U.S. 
electricity sector, they find the ranking is roughly as follows: (1) emissions price, (2) emissions 
performance standard, (3) fossil power tax, (4) renewables share requirement, (5) renewables 
subsidy, and (6) R&D subsidy. Nonetheless, an optimal portfolio of policies—including 
emissions pricing and R&D—achieves emission reductions at significantly lower cost than any 
single policy.   
In a similar exercise, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2006) find an emissions performance 
standard to be cheapest policy for achieving various carbon stabilization goals.  They note that, 
like a carbon tax, the emissions performance standard directly addresses the environmental 
externality.  In addition, like a renewable subsidy, the emissions performance standard stimulates 6 
 
innovation in a sector with high spillovers.  In comparing the results of these two papers, Gerlagh 
and van der Zwaan note that the ordering of policies depends on the assumed returns to scale of 
renewable energy technologies.  Fischer and Newell assume greater decreasing returns to 
renewable energy, due to the scarcity of appropriate sites for new renewable sources.  Thus, an 
important question raised by Gerlagh and van der Zwaan is whether the cost savings from 
innovation will be sufficient to overcome decreasing returns to scale for renewable energy 
resulting from limited space for new solar and wind installations. 
An additional problem resulting from the long time frame of environmental concerns 
such as climate change is uncertainty over future policies.  Consider, for example, a firm 
planning research on fuel cells for cars.  Given that such technologies are not currently 
competitive with traditional fuel sources, and that sufficient policies are not in place to overcome 
these cost differences, what matters to the firm is not the effective price of carbon emissions 
today. Rather, it is the expected price of carbon emissions a decade or more in the future, when 
the vehicle might actually be on the market.  Such long-term issues arise often when studying 
problems such as climate change, and raise the question of whether additional policy measures 
are needed that (1) enable the government to manipulate expectations of future prices, or (2) 
perform the initial research necessary to get ground-breaking technologies close to market, thus 
lowering the cost (and raising political support for) future environmental policy.  That is, one can 
look at this question as whether environmental policy should come first, and be designed in a 
way to encourage long-run innovation, or whether technology policy needs to accompany or 
precede environmental policy, so as to lower the costs of implementing environmental cleanup. 
A related concern is the credibility of governments to use the promise of high future emissions 
prices to boost current innovation, since such high prices may no longer be needed once the 
resulting cost reductions arrive (Kennedy and Laplante 1999; Montgomery and Smith 2007). 
General purpose technologies (GPT) may also magnify the interaction between the two 
market failures.   GPTs are technologies that find use in many distinct application sectors within 
the economy, such as the electric motor, the steam engine, the internal combustion engine, 
semiconductors and the Internet (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).  The development of such 
technologies increases the returns to R&D designed to incorporate them into the different 
applications sectors; development of such applications in turn increases the return to improving 
the GPT.  Because of these dynamic feedback effects, GPTs may be an important factor in 
economic growth (Helpman, 1998).  The dynamic feedback between a GPT and its applications 
sectors also creates an important example of “path dependence.”  With respect to the 
environment, whether the GPTs that drive a particular era are pollution-intensive or pollution-
saving may have profound implications for the long-term environmental prognosis. These 
phenomena can be critical to understanding the existing technological system, forecasting how 
that system might evolve, and predicting the potential effect of some policy or event.  
 
3. Microeconomics: Innovation 
Most investigations of technological change in environmental economics have been at the 
microeconomic level.  As is typical in the field of technological change, these studies can be 
divided into two broad categories – those focusing on invention and innovation, and those 7 
 
focusing on diffusion.  As described in section 2, the externality problem in environmental 
economics complicates the process of environmentally-friendly technological change, as market 
forces provide insufficient incentive for either the creation or adoption of such technologies 
absent environmental policies.  Thus, much research has focused on how environmental policy 
affects the incentives for both the creation and adoption of environmental technology.  This 
section reviews the literature linking environmental policy and innovation.  We discuss the 
diffusion of environmental technologies in section 4.  
 
3.1 Induced Innovation 
Better understanding the links between environmental policy and technological change 
has been a major research agenda in environmental economics.  Much of this literature draws its 
motivation from the notion of induced innovation, which recognizes that R&D is a profit-
motivated investment activity and that the direction of innovation likely responds positively in 
the direction of increased relative prices.  Since environmental policy implicitly or explicitly 
makes environmental inputs more expensive, the “induced innovation” hypothesis suggests an 
important pathway for the interaction of environmental policy and technology, and for the 
introduction of impacts on technological change as a criterion for evaluation of different policy 
instruments. First articulated by Hicks (1932), for further background on induced innovation 
theory and evidence see Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2003), Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) and 
Thirtle and Ruttan (1987). For a recent review of empirical literature on the impacts of 
alternative policy instruments on technological change see Vollebergh (2007). 
In the environmental literature, the relationship between innovation and policy has been 
explored under two broad themes.  Early work focused on theoretical models to compare the 
effects of various environmental policy mechanisms (e.g., uniform standards, emissions taxes, or 
tradable permits) on environmentally-friendly innovation. These papers tend to predict that 
market-based policies, such as a tax or tradable permit, will induce more environmentally-
friendly innovation than a command and control policy, although recent papers have shown that 
a precise ranking is theoretically ambiguous and dependent on a number of factors (see Fischer 
et al 2003 and section 3.1.2).  Empirical studies of the links between environmental policy and 
innovation were initially limited by a lack of data.  Recently, as measures of innovative activity 
such as patents have become more readily available, empirical economists have begun to 
estimate the effects that prices and environmental policies have on environmentally-friendly 
innovation.  We discuss each of these streams of research below. 
3.1.1. Empirical evidence on induced innovation in pollution abatement and energy conservation 
Increased availability of data pertaining to innovation, such as patent counts and R&D 
expenditures has facilitated much research on induced environmental innovation.  The remaining 
challenge in testing the induced innovation hypothesis for environmental technologies is the 
difficulty of measuring the extent or intensity of inducement across firms or industries (Jaffe, et 
al. 1995).  Ideally, one would like to look at the relationship between innovation and the shadow 
price of pollution or environmental inputs.  In practice, such shadow prices are not easily 
observed.  Consequently, one must use proxies for this shadow price, such as characteristics of 8 
 
environmental regulations, expenditures on pollution abatement, or prices of polluting inputs (for 
example, energy prices).  Table 1 summarizes the key papers in this literature. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The first empirical studies made use of pollution abatement control expenditures (PACE) 
to proxy for environmental regulatory stringency.  Jaffe and Palmer (1997) examine the 
correlation between PACE by industry and indicators of innovation more broadly.  They find 
that there is a significant correlation within industries over time between the rate of expenditure 
on pollution abatement and the level of R&D spending.  They do not, however, find evidence of 
an effect of pollution control expenditure on overall patenting.  Hamamoto (2006) finds similar 
effects on R&D spending in Japan.  Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) estimate the relationship 
between PACE and environmental patents across various U.S. industries. They find that patents 
increase by just 0.04 percent when PACE increases by $1 million.   
One limitation of these papers is that they do not take advantage of the disaggregated 
nature of patent data.  Each looks at innovation within specific industries. Jaffe and Palmer 
include  all patents associated with an industry, whether or not they are environmental 
technologies, and Hamamoto includes all R&D activities, not just those focused on the 
environment.  Brunnermeier and Cohen focus specifically on environmental technologies, but 
group several such technologies together for each industry.  Thus, effects of innovation on 
specific technologies may be masked by stagnant trends in other technologies.  Research 
focusing on specific technologies finds stronger effects.  For instance, Lanjouw and Mody 
(1996) use the International Patent Classification (IPC) to identify several key environmental 
patent classes.  Using patent data from the US, Japan, Germany, and 14 low-and middle-income 
countries, they find that environmentally-friendly innovation increases as pollution abatement 
cost expenditures in the country increase.  Hascic et al. (2008) study the effect of environmental 
policy stringency on patenting activity for five different types of environmental technology – air 
pollution, water pollution, waste disposal, noise protection, and environmental monitoring.   
Using both PACE expenditures and a World Economic Forum survey of top management 
business executives as alternative measures of environmental stringency, they find that private 
expenditures on pollution control lead to greater environmental innovation, but not government 
expenditures on pollution control.  However, higher levels of government environmental R&D 
do lead to more environmental patents.  Popp (2006b) finds significant increases in patents 
pertaining to sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions reduction in response to the passage of 
environmental regulations in the United States, Japan, and Germany. 
Evidence of inducement has also been sought by examining the response to changing 
energy prices.  Similar to Lanjouw and Mody, Popp (2002) uses patent classifications to identify 
11 different alternative energy and energy efficiency technologies.  Using a distributed lag 
model, Popp estimates the elasticity of energy patenting activity with respect to energy prices for 
these technologies.  The distributed lag model is consistent with an adaptive expectations model 
of prices, in which expected future prices depend on a weighted average of past prices.  The 
regression controls for the quality of knowledge available to an inventor as well as other factors 
influencing R&D, such as government support for energy research and technology-specific 9 
 
demand shifters.
3  Using this framework, Popp finds a long-run elasticity of energy patenting 
with respect to energy prices of 0.354.  From the distributed lag model, the mean lag occurs in 
3.71 years, and the median lag in 4.86 years.  The interpretation here is that over one-half of the 
full effect of an energy price increase on patenting will have been experienced after just five 
years.  Thus, prices (or other regulations that increase the cost of using fossil fuels) can be 
expected to stimulate new research quickly.   
Popp attributes the gradual decrease in induced innovation over time to diminishing 
returns. Furthermore, Popp (2002) shows that controlling for diminishing returns to research 
within a specific field does affect induced innovation estimates.  To verify the importance of the 
existing knowledge stock on innovative activity, Popp uses citation data to create stocks of 
existing patented knowledge, where patents in the stock are weighted by their propensity to be 
cited.  He finds that the stocks have a significant positive effect on energy patenting.  Moreover, 
both Popp (2002) and Popp (2006c) find evidence that the likelihood of citations to new energy 
patents falls over time, suggesting that the quality of knowledge available for inventors to build 
upon also falls.
4  The intuition here is that, as more and more discoveries are made, it gets harder 
to develop a new innovation that improves upon the existing technology.  Since the quality of the 
knowledge stock is an important determinant of the level of innovative activity, decreasing 
quality of the knowledge stock over time means that diminishing returns to R&D investment will 
result in lower levels of induced R&D over time.  Moreover, because prior research affects the 
potential success of future inventors, the returns to research should vary along with the quality of 
the existing pool of research, rather than monotonically over time.   
To verify the value of using patent citation data to measure the returns to research, Popp 
(2002) also includes regressions in which the stock of knowledge is replaced by a time trend.  If 
diminishing returns proceed monotonically over time, a negative time trend should work as well 
as the weighted knowledge stocks.  That, however, is not the case.  These regressions prove 
unreliable.  In fact, the elasticity of energy R&D to energy prices appears negative when a time 
trend is used in place of the knowledge stocks.  Since diminishing returns are a bigger problem 
when the level of energy R&D is highest, not controlling for this counteracts the positive effect 
of prices on energy R&D.  This may also explain the small effects of environmental policy on 
patenting activity found by Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003). 
Environmental economists have also studied induced innovation by decomposing 
changes in energy efficiency into changes due to price-based substitution and changes due to 
innovation.  Newell et al. (1999) examine the extent to which the energy efficiency of the menu 
of home appliances available for sale changed in response to energy prices between 1958 and 
1993, using an econometric model of induced innovation as changing characteristics of capital 
goods. Hicks formulated the induced innovation hypothesis in terms of factor prices.  Newell, 
Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) generalize this concept to include inducement by regulatory standards, 
such as labeling requirements that might increase the value of certain product characteristics by 
                                                 
3 For example, for patents on using waste products as energy, the price utilities pay to purchase waste products for 
fuel is included in the regression. This figure captures the increased supply of waste that became available as fuel 
owing to concerns about declining landfill space during the 1980’s. 
4 Note that since the probability of a patent being cited depends not only on the quality of the patent, but also on the 
number of patents that follow, it is important to look at probability of citation, rather than raw citation counts. 10 
 
making consumers more aware of them.  More generally, non-price regulatory constraints can fit 
within the inducement framework if they can be modeled as changing the shadow or implicit 
price that firms face in emitting pollutants.  In their framework, the existing technology for 
making a given type of equipment at a point in time is identified in terms of vectors of 
characteristics (including cost of manufacture) that are feasible.  The process of invention makes 
it possible to manufacture “models” (characteristics vectors) that were previously infeasible.   
Innovation means the offering for commercial sale of a model that was not previously offered for 
sale.  Induced innovation is then represented as movements in the frontier of feasible models that 
reduce the cost of energy efficiency in terms of other attributes.  
By constructing a series of dynamic simulations, they examine the effects of energy price 
changes and efficiency standards on average efficiency of the menu of products over time.  They 
find that a substantial amount of the improvement was what may be described as autonomous 
(that is, associated with the passage of time), but significant amounts of innovation are also due 
to changes in energy prices and changes in energy-efficiency standards. They find that 
technological change in air conditioners was actually biased against energy efficiency in the 
1960s (when real energy prices were falling), but that this bias was reversed after the two energy 
shocks of the 1970s.  In terms of the efficiency of the average model offered, they find that 
energy efficiency in 1993 would have been about one-quarter to one-half lower in air 
conditioners and gas water heaters, if energy prices had stayed at their 1973 levels, rather than 
following their historical path. Most of the response to energy price changes came within less 
than five years of those changes. Illustrating the importance of information, they find that the 
effect of energy-price increases on model substitution was strongest after product labeling 
requirements took effect.   
 
3.1.2. Innovation and the Choice of Policy Instrument 
The empirical studies on induced innovation provide some insight as to the pace of 
environmental innovation.  Also important, however, is the nature of such innovation.  Early 
theoretical work on environmental innovation focused on the incentives provided by different 
types of environmental policy.  Environmental policies can be characterized as either uniform 
“command-and-control” standards or market-based approaches.  Market-based instruments are 
mechanisms that encourage behavior through market signals rather than through explicit 
directives regarding pollution control levels or methods.  Such regulations allow firms flexibility 
to choose the least-cost solutions to improved environmental performance.  In contrast, 
conventional approaches to regulating the environment are often referred to as “command-and-
control” regulations, since they allow relatively little flexibility in the means of achieving goals.  
These regulations tend to force firms to take on similar magnitudes of the pollution-control 
burden, regardless of the cost.  Command-and-control regulations do this by setting uniform 
standards for firms.  The most commonly used types of command-and-control regulation are 
performance- and technology-based standards.  A performance standard sets a uniform control 
target for firms (emissions per unit of output, for example), while allowing some latitude in how 
this target is met. Technology-based standards specify the method, and sometimes the actual 
equipment, that firms must use to comply with a particular regulation. 
Holding all firms to the same target can be expensive and, in some circumstances, 11 
 
counterproductive.  While standards may effectively limit emissions of pollutants, they typically 
exact relatively high costs in the process, by forcing some firms to resort to unduly expensive 
means of controlling pollution. Because the costs of controlling emissions may vary greatly 
among firms, and even among sources within the same firm, the appropriate technology in one 
situation may not be cost-effective in another. 
  All of these forms of intervention have the potential for inducing or forcing some 
amount of technological change, because by their very nature they induce or require firms to do 
things they would not otherwise do.  Performance and technology standards can be explicitly 
designed to be "technology forcing," mandating performance levels that are not currently viewed 
as technologically feasible or mandating technologies that are not fully developed. One problem 
with these approaches, however, is that while regulators can typically assume that some amount 
of improvement over existing technology will always be feasible, it is impossible to know how 
much.  Standards must either be made unambitious, or else run the risk of being ultimately 
unachievable, leading to political and economic disruption (Freeman and Haveman 1972). 
Technology standards are particularly problematic, since they can freeze the development 
of technologies that might otherwise result in greater levels of control.  Under regulations that 
are targeted at technologies, as opposed to emissions levels, no financial incentive exists for 
businesses to exceed control targets, and the adoption of new technologies is discouraged.   
However, there is still an incentive for equipment cost reduction. Under a “Best Available 
Control Technology” (BACT) standard, a business that adopts a new method of pollution 
abatement may be “rewarded” by being held to a higher standard of performance and thereby not 
benefit financially from its investment, except to the extent that its competitors have even more 
difficulty reaching the new standard (Hahn and Stavins 1991).  On the other hand, if third parties 
can invent and patent better equipment, they can — in theory — have a ready market.  Under 
such conditions, a BACT type of standard can provide a positive incentive for technology 
innovation.   
In contrast with such command-and-control regulations, market-based instruments can 
provide powerful incentives for companies to adopt cheaper and better pollution-control 
technologies.  This is because with market-based instruments, it always pays firms to clean up a 
bit more if a sufficiently low-cost method (technology or process) of doing so can be identified 
and adopted.  The advantages of market-based policies are particularly true for flexible policies 
that allow the innovator to identify the best way to meet the policy goal.  For instance, a carbon 
tax allows innovators to choose whatever technologies best reduce carbon emissions, whereas a 
tax credit for wind power focuses innovative efforts on wind power at the expense of other clean 
energy technologies. 
Most papers on the effect of different environmental policy instruments on innovation are 
theoretical in nature.  In addition, these papers pay greater attention to the supply side, focusing 
on incentives for firm-level decisions to incur R&D costs in the face of uncertain outcomes.  
These papers are summarized in Table 2.  We defer a discussion of papers analyzing the effect of 
policy on technology adoption and diffusion to Section 4 of this chapter. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 12 
 
3.1.2.1 Theory 
The earliest work that is directly relevant is by Magat (1978), who compares effluent 
taxes and CAC standards using an innovation possibilities frontier model of induced innovation, 
where research can be used to augment capital or labor in a standard production function.  He 
compares the output rate, effluent rate, output-effluent ratio, and bias (in terms of labor or capital 
augmenting technical change), but produced ambiguous results.  Subsequently, Magat (1979) 
compares taxes, subsidies, permits, effluent standards, and technology standards, and shows that 
all but technology standards would induce innovation biased toward emissions reduction.  In 
Magat’s model, if taxes and permits are set so that they lead to the same reduction in emissions 
as an effluent standard at all points in time, then the three instruments provide the same 
incentives to innovate. 
Taking a somewhat broader view than most economic studies, Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1994) suggest that environmental policy instruments should be viewed jointly with traditional 
industrial policy instruments in determining the optimal way to attain a given degree of pollution 
abatement.  They show that innovation subsidies can be used to attain the same environmental 
target as other policy instruments, but without the output reductions that result from pollution 
taxes. Laffont and Tirole (1996) examine how a tradable permit system could — in theory — be 
modified to achieve desired incentive effects for technological change.  They demonstrate that 
although spot markets for permits cannot induce the socially optimal degree of innovation, 
futures markets can improve the situation.  
Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagne (1996) consider a potentially regulated industry that has 
private information on the costs of technological advances in pollution control, as is frequently 
the case.  Since the industry has an incentive to claim that such technologies are prohibitively 
expensive (even if that is not the case), can the government somehow design an incentive scheme 
that will avoid the problems of this information asymmetry?  The authors develop a solution to 
this game-theoretic problem involving government-issued threats of regulation (which diminish 
over time as the firm completes stages of technology development). 
It was only recently that theoretical work followed up on Magat’s attempt in the late 
1970’s to rank policy instruments according to their innovation-stimulating effects.  Fischer et al. 
(2003) find that an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments was not possible.  Rather, the 
ranking of policy instruments was shown by the authors to depend on the innovator’s ability to 
appropriate spillover benefits of new technologies to other firms, the costs of innovation, 
environmental benefit functions, and the number of firms producing emissions. 
The basic model consists of three stages.  First, an innovating firm decides how much to 
invest in R&D by setting its marginal cost of innovation equal to the expected marginal benefits.  
Second, polluting firms decide whether or not to adopt the new technology, use an (inferior) 
imitation of it, or do nothing.  Finally, firms minimize pollution control expenditures by setting 
their marginal costs equal to the price of pollution.  Policy instruments affect the innovation 
incentives primarily through three effects: (1) an abatement cost affect, reflecting the extent to 
which innovation reduces the costs of pollution control; (2) an imitation effect, which weakens 
innovation incentives due to imperfect appropriability; and (3) an emissions payment effect, 
which can weaken incentives if innovation reduces firms’ payments for residual emissions. The 
relative strength of these effects will vary across policy instruments and particular applications, 13 
 
with no instrument clearly dominating in all applications.  
In an analysis that is quite similar in its results to the study by Fischer et al. (2003), Ulph 
(1998) compares the effects of pollution taxes and command-and-control standards, and finds 
that increases in the stringency of the standard or tax had ambiguous effects on the level of R&D, 
because environmental regulations have two competing effects:  a direct effect of increasing 
costs, which increases the incentives to invest in R&D in order to develop cost-saving pollution-
abatement methods; and an indirect effect of reducing product output, which reduces the 
incentive to engage in R&D.  Carraro and Soubeyran (1996) compare an emission tax and an 
R&D subsidy, and found that an R&D subsidy is desirable if the output contractions induced by 
the tax are small or if the government finds output contractions undesirable for other reasons.  
Addressing the same trade-off, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) find that a simultaneous tax 
on pollution emissions and subsidy to environmental R&D may be better suited to overcoming 
the joint market failure (negative externality from pollution and positive externality or spillover 
effects of R&D).  
Montero (2002) compares instruments under non-competitive circumstances, and finds 
that the results are less clear than when perfect competition is assumed.  He models a two-firm 
oligopoly facing environmental regulation in the form of emissions standards, freely-allocated 
permits, auctioned permits, and taxes.  Firms can invest in R&D to lower their marginal 
abatement costs, and they can also benefit from spillover effects from the other firm’s R&D 
efforts.  In choosing whether and how much to invest in R&D in order to maximize profits, a 
firm must consider two effects of its investment choice:  (1) the increase in profits due to a 
decrease in its abatement costs (less the R&D cost); and (2) the decrease in profits due to 
changes in the other firm’s output, as a result of spillover from the first firm’s R&D.  The result 
is that standards and taxes yield higher incentives for R&D when the market is characterized by 
Cournot competition, but the opposite holds when the market is characterized by Bertrand 
competition. 
Addressing a policymaker’s choice of the level of environmental regulation, Innes and 
Bial (2002) start with the observation that firms often overcomply with environmental 
regulation.  They explain this behavior using a model of Bertrand competition.  In such a model, 
a successful innovator may prefer stricter environmental standards so as to raise costs for rival 
firms.  An environmental tax that is efficient ex post (e.g. after a new innovation is revealed) also 
provides incentives for overinvestment in R&D, as firms hope to gain profits by being the first to 
invent an environmental technology that will affect regulatory levels and impose costs on other 
firms.  Innes and Bial show that discriminatory standards for technology “winners” and “losers” 
can offset incentives for overinvestment.  For example, regulators can offer non-innovating firms 
a lower emissions reduction target or additional time to comply with regulatory changes.  If the 
policy levels are optimally set, technology winners still have incentive to overcomply with 
environmental regulation, as their profits exactly equal the social gains from their innovation. 
Noting that the stringency of an optimal policy may change after new abatement 
technologies become available, Requate (2005) asks when policy adjustments should be made.  
The model considers a monopolistic provider of environmental technology that performs R&D in 
response to environmental regulation, and a set of competitive firms who purchase 
environmental equipment when required by law.  The paper considers four policy options: ex 
post regulation after adoption of new technology, interim regulation after observing R&D 14 
 
success but before adoption, ex ante regulation with different tax rates contingent on R&D 
success, and ex ante regulation with a single tax rate whether or not R&D is successful.  In this 
model, ex ante commitment with different tax rates dominates all other policies, and tax policies 
are always superior to permit policies. 
A recent paper by Bauman, Lee, and Seeley (2008) raises the possibility that command 
and control policies may induce more innovation under certain scenarios. They note that the 
results of previous models follow when innovation lowers the marginal abatement cost curve.  
However, these papers assume end-of-pipe solutions to pollution reduction, such as installing a 
scrubber on a smokestack.  For end-of-pipe solutions, the marginal cost of no abatement is zero, 
so that a marginal abatement cost curve starts at the origin.  In such cases, innovation always 
results in lower marginal abatement costs.  However, pollution can also be reduced by changing 
processes, such as using cleaner fuel or using a more efficient boiler.  In such cases, innovation 
may make the marginal abatement cost steeper.  For instance, if a plant plans to reduce emissions 
by shutting down temporarily, it will forego more output (and profit) when it is using a more 
efficient boiler.  In these cases, the marginal abatement cost curve after innovation will not be 
unambiguously below the original marginal abatement cost curve.  Should that occur, command 
and control standards may provide greater incentive for innovation than market-based policies.  
Note, however, that their analysis is positive rather than normative in nature and does not 
directly address the traditional view that market-based policies are overall more efficient than 
command and control. 
Finally, Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008) show that the way in which technological change 
affects the shape of the marginal abatement cost curve also affects R&D decisions made under 
uncertainty.  Their model considers both uncertainty about future climate damages (and thus the 
optimal level of abatement needed) and uncertainty about the likelihood of success for various 
energy research projects.  R&D investment affects the probability that a project will be 
successful.  They consider two types of energy R&D projects: alternative energy that emits no 
carbon and efficiency improvements for conventional fossil fuel energy sources.  For alternative 
energy R&D, technological improvements unambiguously lower the cost of reducing carbon 
emissions (e.g. shift marginal abatement costs down).  In this case, the socially optimal 
investment in technologies is higher for riskier projects.  However, the opposite is true for 
research on conventional energy technologies, for which technological change rotates the 
marginal abatement cost curve.  For low levels of abatement, improvements to conventional 
technologies, such as increased fuel efficiency, lower abatement costs.  However, if high levels 
of abatement are required, simply improving energy efficiency will not be sufficient – alternative 
clean energy sources will need to replace traditional fossil fuel sources of energy.  In this case, 
improvements in the efficiency of conventional technologies raise the marginal abatement cost, 
as they raise the opportunity cost of eliminating fossil fuels.  In such a case, optimal R&D 
investment is higher for less-risky R&D projects. These projects have a higher probability of 
success, but will only have moderate efficiency gains.  However, moderate efficiency gains will 
have a large impact on the economy, since fossil fuels are widely used.  In contrast, the payoff 
from risky R&D projects with larger efficiency gains is not as high.  Efficiency gains are most 
valuable under low climate damage scenarios.  If climate damages are high, energy efficiency 
gains will have little value, since fossil fuels won’t be used.  Thus, the need for energy efficiency 
breakthroughs is not as high as the need for breakthroughs for alternative energy. 15 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
3.1.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Empirically, there is little work that compares innovation under different policy types.  
Table 3 summarizes these papers.  One exception is Popp (2003), which compares innovation 
before and after SO2 permit trading began in the United States.  This paper combines patent data 
with plant-level data on flue gas desulfurization (FGD) units, or “scrubbers” to compare 
innovation before and after passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act.  Popp finds that the level of 
innovation, measured by the number of successful patent applications by year, for FGD units was 
actually higher before tradable sulfur dioxide (SO2) permits were introduced by the 1990 Clean 
Air Act (CAA).  However, the nature of innovation changed after passage of the Act.  Before the 
1990 Clean Air Act, most new coal-fired electric utilities were required to install FGD units with 
a removal efficiency of 90%.  Since installation of FGD units was mandatory, innovation 
focused on reducing the operating costs of these units.  However, since there were no incentives 
for firms to exceed the 90% limit, innovation had no effect on the removal efficiency of FGD 
units.  In contrast, because the 1990 CAA required greater SO2 emissions reductions and gave 
firms flexibility as to how to meet those goals, post-1990 innovations did have the effect of 
improving the removal efficiency of scrubbers.  Similarly, Taylor et al. (2003) note that the 
scrubber requirement led to a reduction in patents on pre-combustion techniques for reducing 
SO2 emissions, such as cleaner coal.  However, Taylor (2008) notes that, since most pollution 
control innovators are third-party equipment vendors, rather than the regulated firms, uncertainty 
over how regulated firms will react to permits (and thus uncertainty over the ultimate permit 
price) reduces innovation incentives from permit trading vis-à-vis other policy instruments. 
In contrast, Bellas (1998) finds no evidence of progress in scrubber technology. 
However, his study only includes plants from 1970-1991.  Thus, the analysis only considers 
plants under the command and control policy regime. In more recent work, Lange and Bellas 
(2005) update this research by estimating the effect of scrubber characteristics on both capital 
and operating costs of scrubbers installed before and after the 1990 CAA.  The permit trading 
system of the 1990 CAA provided, for the first time, incentives for older plants to install 
scrubbers.  This expanded the market for scrubbers, which, they argue, should increase 
incentives for technological change.  Indeed, Lange and Bellas find that both capital and 
operating expenses drop for scrubbers installed after the 1990 CAA took effect.  However, they 
find this drop to be a discrete event – costs are lower after the 1990 CAA, but the rate of change 
in costs does not change.  While they find no evidence of cost differences between scrubbers 
installed under the 1970 CAA and the 1977 CAA (which mandated installation of scrubbers at 
plants built beginning in 1978), they do not explicitly address whether costs change over time 
during this period. 
Addressing the value of flexible standards, Lanoie et al. (2007) use a survey of firms in 
seven OECD countries to examine the effect of various environmental policy instruments on 
environmental R&D.  Respondents were asked to describe both the type of environmental 
policies faced, as well as the stringency of such policies.  They find that greater stringency does 
induce a firm to perform more environmental R&D.  More flexible performance standards, 
which dictate an acceptable level of environmental performance, but do not dictate how that 
level be achieved, induce more environmental R&D than technology standards, which require 
the use of a specific technology to meet regulatory targets.  Surprisingly, being exposed to 16 
 
market-based environmental policies does not induce greater environmental R&D.  One 
explanation given for this result is that when market-based policies are used, they may be less 
stringent than other environmental standards.  In related work, Johnstone and Hascic (2008) 
show that flexible environmental regulations lead to higher quality innovation.  Using a World 
Economic Forum survey of business executives, they show that environmental patents have 
larger family sizes when executives in the inventor’s home country perceive that there is greater 
freedom to choose different options in order to achieve compliance with environmental 
regulations.  
There is a more extensive literature on the effects of alternative policy instruments on the 
innovation of energy-efficiency and alternative energy technologies.  The innovation process can 
be thought of as affecting improvements in the characteristics of products on the market, and the 
process can be framed as the shifting inward over time of a frontier representing the tradeoffs 
between different product characteristics for the range of models available on the market.  If one 
axis is the cost of the product and another axis is the energy flow associated with a product, that 
is, its energy intensity, then innovation is represented by inward shifts of the curve — greater 
energy efficiency at the same cost, or lower cost for given energy efficiency.  With this 
approach, Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) assess the effects of changes in energy prices and in 
energy-efficiency standards in stimulating innovation.  Energy price changes induced both 
commercialization of new models and elimination of old models.  Regulations, however, worked 
largely through energy-inefficient models being dropped, since that is the intended effect of the 
energy-efficiency standards (models below a certain energy efficiency level may not be offered 
for sale). 
Finally, Johnstone et al. (2008) use a panel of patent data on renewable energy 
technologies across 25 OECD countries to examine the effect of different policy instruments on 
innovation.  They compare price-based policies such as tax credits and feed-in tariffs
5 to 
quantity-based policies such as renewable energy mandates.  They find important differences 
across technologies.  Quantity-based policies favor development of wind energy.  Of the various 
alternative energy technologies, wind has the lowest cost and is closest to being competitive with 
traditional energy sources.  As such, when faced with a mandate to provide alternative energy, 
firms focus their innovative efforts on the technology that is closest to market.  In contrast, direct 
investment incentives are effective in supporting innovation in solar and waste-to-energy 
technologies, which are further from being competitive with traditional energy technologies.  
These results suggest particular challenges to policy makers who wish to encourage long-run 
innovation for technologies that have yet to near market competitiveness. 
 
3.1.3. What Can Technological Change Economists Contribute? 
Studying the links between environmental policy and innovation is one of the most active 
areas in environmental economics.  Still, there are unanswered questions where technological 
change economists could contribute.  In particular, many of the empirical studies above use 
aggregate data, typically at the level of an industry or a technology.  More micro-oriented studies 
                                                 
5 Feed-in tariffs, used in various European countries, guarantee renewable energy producers a minimum price for the 
electricity they produce. 17 
 
that concentrate on firm behavior would be of particular use.  Such questions that might be 
addressed in such studies include where environmental R&D comes from (e.g., does 
environmental policy lead firms to perform new R&D, or to shift research efforts from other 
areas towards the environment) and which types of firms are best able to deliver environmental 
innovations.  For instance, research on the effects of firm size and/or market structure on 
innovation, which has received much attention from technological change economists, has yet to 
enter significantly into environmental economics. This may be particularly important for energy, 
where market power and deregulation have both been important.  For example, Sanyal (2007) 
finds that deregulation of electric utility markets has led to a decrease in R&D in the industry.  
More research developing a better understanding of these differences across firms could help 
policy makers design incentives appropriate for specific industries.   
The role of expectations has also not received significant attention in the literature on 
environmental technological change. Incentives to innovate require beliefs about the future 
returns to innovation.  For environmental problems, those future returns depend on the policies 
that will be in place.  To what extent can policy makers both provide current incentives for 
innovation and signal the future costs of pollution to inventors?  Are current policy instruments 
sufficient to address the uncertainties and long time frames often observed with environmental 
problems?  Understanding the ways in which policy can manipulate expectations of future 
energy and emissions prices and policy would be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
3.2. The Impacts of Technological Change 
The research described in section 3.1 focuses on the relationship between incentives 
(either market prices or policy) and the direction and level of technological change.  In addition 
to these questions, another important research question is the effect of these new technologies on 
the environment.  In the broader literature on technological change, economists consistently find 
that knowledge spillovers result in a wedge between private and social rates return to R&D.  
Examples of such studies include Mansfield (1977, 1996), Pakes (1985), Jaffe (1986), Hall 
(1996), and Jones and Williams (1998).  Typical results include marginal social rates of return 
between 30 and 50 percent.   
One would expect to find similar results in the environmental literature. However, two 
issues may complicate estimates of social returns on environmental R&D.  One is the twin 
market failure problem discussed in section 2.  The high social rates of return found in most 
studies of technological change occur as a result of imperfections in knowledge markets, such as 
spillovers.  While these market failures are still an issue here, they are magnified by the 
externalities problem common in environmental economics.  This complicates measuring the 
impact of environmental innovation, as the value of any resulting gains in environmental quality 
are difficult to quantify.  For example, one could study how innovations benefit firms, either by 
lowering the cost of compliance with regulation (such as the paper by Bellas and Lange cited in 
section 3.1.2), or, in the case of energy efficiency, by lowering the energy costs of firms or 
consumers.  Such measures should give results analogous to those in the broader literature on 
technological change, but will give an incomplete measure of the social returns to environmental 
innovation, as they do not measure the value of environmental quality improvements that result.  
While there is a broad literature on measuring the benefits of environmental quality (see, for 18 
 
example, Mäler and Vincent, 2005), these measures are often indirect, and have yet to be 
incorporated into studies on the return to environmental innovations. 
 
3.2.1 Empirical Evidence 
There has been exceptionally little empirical analysis of the effects that innovation has on 
the costs of pollution abatement, principally because of the paucity of available data.  Carlson et 
al. (2000) look at changes in the marginal abatement costs at power plants, and find that about 
20%, or $50, of the change in marginal abatement costs that have occurred from 1985 to 1995 
can be attributed to technological change.  Popp (2003) uses patent data to link innovative 
activity to lower operating costs of scrubbers for coal-fired electric power plants.  Popp 
aggregates patents pertaining to scrubber innovations into a knowledge stock, and then regresses 
the operating costs of individual scrubbers on scrubber and plant characteristics, including the 
knowledge stock at the time the scrubber was installed.  A single patent provides a present value 
of $6 million in cost savings across the industry.  Assuming approximately $1.5 million of R&D 
spent per patent granted, this yields a return similar to those found in the more general works 
cited above.  However, these savings account only for the benefits to the power industry of lower 
environmental regulation compliance costs, as the social benefits of reduced sulfur dioxide 
emissions are not included in this estimate. 
In contrast, the effects of innovation on energy-efficiency have been studied more widely.  
In addition to the studies discussed in section 3.1.2, Pakes, et al. (1993) investigate the effects of 
gasoline prices on the fuel economy of motor vehicles offered for sale.  They find that the 
observed increase in miles per gallon (mpg) from 1977 onward was largely due to the 
consequent change in the mix of vehicles on the market.  Fewer low-mpg cars were marketed, 
and more high-mpg cars were marketed.  Subsequently, Berry et al. (1996) combine plant-level 
cost data for the automobile industry and information on the characteristics of models that were 
produced at each plant to estimate a hedonic cost function — the supply-side component of the 
hedonic price function — finding that quality-adjusted costs generally increased over the period 
1972–1982, thus coinciding with rising gasoline prices and emission standards. 
One of the challenges of studying the effects of technology indirectly can be found by 
comparing empirical studies from different eras.  Many studies use a time trend to represent 
technological change, so that the results are interpreted as the net effect of all technological 
change in a given period.  For example, in a study of U.S. industrial energy consumption from 
1958 to 1974, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1981) find that technological change was energy-using – 
energy use per unit output increased over time.  Of course, the time period of their data would 
not include any of the energy saving innovations developed after the energy crises of the 1970s.  
In contrast, more recent work using a time trend to capture technological change finds that 
technology is energy saving.  Examples include Berndt et al. (1993), Mountain et al. (1989) and 
Sterner (1990). 
As an alternative to using a time trend to represent technology, Popp (2001) uses energy 
patents to estimate the effect of new technology on energy consumption.  Popp begins by 
matching energy patents with the industries that use the inventions by using the Yale Technology 
Concordance (Evenson et al. 1991, Kortum and Putnam 1989, 1997).  Using these patents, Popp 
creates stocks of energy knowledge, which are used as an explanatory variable in a system of 19 
 
cost functions for 13 energy intensive industries.  The knowledge stocks are defined as a 
cumulative function of the number of past energy patents used by each industry, adjusted for 
gradual decay and diffusion. Using these knowledge stocks in a cost function of energy usage, 
Popp finds that the median patent leads to $14.5 million dollars in long-run energy savings.  In 
comparison, these industries spend an average of $2.25 million of R&D per patent.  In addition, using 
estimates of the elasticity of patenting with respect to energy prices for these technologies, Popp 
calculates the effect of induced innovation as the combined effect of all new patents induced by a 
one-percent energy price increase. Interestingly, the estimated elasticities of energy use with 
respect to price found in that paper are lower than typically found, as they include only the effect 
of factor substitution, since technological change is controlled for separately.  By comparison, re-
running the regressions using only a time trend to represent technological change provides 
energy price elasticities that are consistent with those found in other studies, as such studies 
include the effect of price-induced innovation in their estimates.   
Similarly, Sue Wing (2008) uses patent stocks in a series of industry-level regressions to 
identify the effects of changing industry composition, disembodied technological change, factor 
substitution, and induced innovation in response to energy prices on declining U.S. energy 
intensity.  While Popp focuses on energy-intensive industries, Sue Wing’s data includes 35 
industries from 1958-2000.  He finds changing composition and disembodied technological 
change to be the dominant factors.  Induced innovation does have an energy-saving effect, but it 
is the smallest of the four factors studied. 
Finally, Linn (2008) looks at the effect of energy prices on the adoption of energy saving 
technology in the US manufacturing sector.  Using Census of Manufacturers data to compare 
energy use in new and incumbent facilities, he finds that a 10 percent increase in the price of 
energy leads to technology adoption that reduces energy demand of entrants by 1 percent.  Given 
this, Linn concludes that technology adoption explains just a small portion of changes in energy 
demand during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
3.2.2. Estimates of Technological Impact Using Learning-by-Doing 
While only a few studies make a direct link between R&D and environmental or energy 
impact, a more extensive literature has made use of experience curves to estimate the rates of 
cost decreases in energy technology. A long-recognized concept, technological learning first was 
quantified by Wright (1936) for the aircraft industry. In economics, the concept is often 
described as learning-by-doing (LBD), and generally is defined as the decrease in costs to 
manufacturers as a function of cumulative output, or “learning-by-using,” and the decrease in 
costs (and/or increase in benefits) to consumers as a function of the use of a technology (Arrow, 
1962, Rosenberg, 1982).
6 LBD commonly is measured in the form of “learning” or “experience” 
curves in terms of how much unit costs decline as a function of experience or production. 
Among energy analysts, these estimates are often used to calibrate energy-economic models for 
simulating the effects of climate policy, with a particular focus on alternative energy sources.
7  A 
typical learning curve estimation regresses costs of installation (or production) at different points 
                                                 
6 Note that “learning-by-searching” (based on cumulative R&D expenditures) also has been used in the literature, 
but it is essentially R&D-induced technological change (see, e.g., Bahn and Kypreos (2003)). 
7 Köhler et al. (2006) includes a review of these studies.   20 
 
in time as a function of cumulative installed capacity (or sometimes cumulative output) in log-
log fashion. The resulting elasticity coefficient on cumulative capacity in these models (α) is 
often translated into a so-called “learning rate” (1-2
-α) giving the percentage change in costs 
resulting from a doubling in cumulative capacity.  Typically, studies on new energy technologies 
find faster learning for younger technologies, with estimates clustering around 15-20% for 
alternative energy sources such as wind and solar energy (McDonald and Schrattenholzer 2000).  
One significant caveat with estimated learning rates is that they typically focus on 
correlations between energy technology usage and costs, rather than causation.  Recent papers by 
Klaasen et al. (2005), Söderholm and Sundqvist (2007), and Söderholm and Klaasen (2007) 
attempt to disentangle the separate contributions of R&D and experience by estimating “two-
factor” learning curves for environmental technologies.  These two-factor curves model cost 
reductions as a function of both cumulative capacity (learning-by-doing) and R&D (learning-by-
searching, or LBS).  To be comparable with the notion of cumulative capacity, in these models 
R&D is typically aggregated into a stock of R&D capital.  Thus, endogeneity is a concern, as we 
would expect both investments in capacity to be a function of past R&D expenditures and R&D 
expenditures to be influenced by capacity, which helps determine demand for R&D.  Söderholm 
and Sundqvist address this endogeneity in their paper and find LBD rates around 5 percent, and 
LBS rates around 15 percent, suggesting that R&D, rather than learning-by-doing, contributes 
more to cost reductions.  However, these results are very sensitive to the model specification, 
illustrating the difficulty of sorting through the various channels through which costs may fall 
over time. 
To further address the problems associated with estimating and interpreting learning 
curves, Nemet (2006) uses simulation techniques to decompose cost reductions for PV cells into 
seven categories.  Plant size (e.g. returns to scale), efficiency improvements, and lower silicon 
costs explain the majority of cost reductions.  Notably, most of the major improvements in 
efficiency come from universities, where traditional learning by doing through production 
experience would not be a factor.  Learning from experience (e.g. through increased yield of PV 
cells) plays a much smaller role, accounting for just 10 percent of the cost decreases in Nemet’s 
sample. 
While research on the various sources of cost reductions is limited, these results provide 
some guidelines for incorporating estimates of learning into environmental policy models.  Most 
importantly, these results suggest that the relative importance of both learning by doing and 
R&D must be considered when calibrating models that include both.  The main lesson here is to 
avoid double counting.  A LBD rate of just five percent, such as found by Söderholm and 
Sundqvist, is lower than typically reported in the LBD literature, where learning rates of 15-20 
percent are common.  A simple one-factor LBD curve shows an association between capacity 
and costs, but does not address causation.  A two-factor curve begins to address this problem by 
including a major omitted variable.  As such, while the combined effect of LBD and LBS in a 
two-factor model may be comparable to learning rates from a one-factor model, the individual 
components should be smaller. Fischer and Newell (2008) show how one can jointly incorporate 
both R&D-based and learning-based technological change into an analytical and numerical 
model, while taking care to parameterize the model based on available empirical evidence. 21 
 
 
3.2.3. Government R&D 
Until now, we have focused primarily on the incentives faced, and activities conducted, 
by private firms.  However, governments also play an important role in energy R&D.    The U.S. 
Department of Energy spent about $4 billion on energy R&D in 2007 (Newell 2008a).8   This 
government investment plays several roles, each of which offers challenges to economists 
focusing on environmental innovation.   
First, note that government R&D can help to compensate for underinvestment by private 
firms.  Unlike firms, the government is in position to consider social returns when making 
investment decisions.  In addition, government R&D tends to have different objectives than 
private R&D.  Government support is particularly important for basic R&D, as long-term 
payoffs, greater uncertainty, and the lack of a finished product at the end all make it difficult for 
private firms to appropriate the returns of basic R&D.  Thus, the nature of government R&D is 
important. For example, Popp (2002) finds that government energy R&D served as a substitute 
for private energy R&D during the 1970s, but as a complement to private energy R&D 
afterwards. One explanation given for the change in impact is the changing nature of energy 
R&D.  During the 1970s, much government R&D funding went to applied projects such as the 
effort to produce synfuels.  Beginning with the Reagan administration, government R&D shifted 
towards a focus on more basic applications. 
The analyses that have been conducted of U.S. federal research relating to energy and the 
environment have come to mixed conclusions. Cohen and Noll (1991) documented the waste 
associated with the breeder reactor and synthetic fuel programs in the 1970s, but in the same 
volume Pegram (1991) concluded that the photovoltaics research program undertaken in the 
same time frame had significant benefits. More recently, the U.S. National Research Council 
attempted a fairly comprehensive overview of energy efficiency and fossil energy research at 
DOE over the last two decades (National Research Council 2001). Using both estimates of 
overall return and case studies, they concluded, as one might expect, that there were only a 
handful of programs that proved highly valuable. Their estimates of returns suggest, however, 
that the benefits of these successes justified the overall portfolio investment. 
In addition to correcting for underinvestment by private firms, many government R&D 
projects aim to improve commercialization of new technologies (referred to as “transfer” from 
basic to applied research).  Such projects typically combine basic and applied research, and are 
often done through government/industry partnerships (National Science Board, 2006).  For 
example, the United States passed several policies in the 1980s specifically designed to improve 
transfer from the more basic research done at government and university laboratories to the 
applied research done by industry to create marketable products.9  As such, this technology 
transfer can be seen as a step between the processes of invention and innovation.   
                                                 
8 Note that this is not the total DOE R&D budget, much of which goes to defense-related projects.  Rather, it is DOE 
budget items focused on energy supply, energy efficiency, and basic energy sciences. Existing estimates place the 
level of U.S. industrial energy R&D at roughly $2 billion per year in 2004; however private sector R&D investments 
relevant to energy technology are extremely difficult to assess and these numbers likely represent an underestimate 
(Newell 2008a).  
9 Examples include the Stevenson-Wylder Technology Innovation Act of 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, and the 
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986. 22 
 
A small number of papers have addressed the role of government R&D plays facilitating 
transfer of energy technology.  Jaffe and Lerner (2001) study the effectiveness of federally 
funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) owned by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE). Jaffe and Lerner supplement a detailed patent citation analysis of patents assigned either 
directly to the laboratories or to private contractors who collaborated on research at the DOE labs 
with case studies of two DOE laboratories where technology transfer efforts increased in the 
1980s and 1990s.
10  They find that both patenting and the number of citations received per patent 
increased at DOE laboratories since the policy shifts of the 1980s.  That citations received also 
increase after the 1980 policy changes contrasts with the findings of researchers studying 
academic patenting, where patenting increases, but the quality of patents appears to decline.  
They also find that the type of research performed at a laboratory affects technology transfer.  
Transfer is slower when more basic research is performed, or when the research has national 
security implications.  Interestingly, FFRDCs with greater contractor turnover appear to be more 
successful at commercializing new technologies. 
Popp (2006c) examines citations made to patents in 11 energy technology categories, 
such as wind and solar energy.  He finds that energy patents spawned by government R&D are 
cited more frequently than other energy patents.  This is consistent with the notion that these 
patents are more basic.  More importantly, after passage of the technology transfer acts in the 
early 1980s, the children of these patents (that is, privately-held patents that cite government 
patents) are the most frequently cited patents, suggesting that transferring research results from 
the government to private industry produces valuable research results.  
 
3.2.4. What Can Technological Change Economists Contribute? 
There is much for technological change economists to contribute on the topic of 
measuring the impact of technological change.  A particular challenge for environmental and 
energy technologies is the measurement of research inputs and their impacts.  Because of the 
long-term, uncertain nature of the environmental problem, government R&D funding plays an 
important role in the field.  The mix of public and private research funding presents a challenge 
for estimating the effect of R&D.  In general, one would expect government R&D to take longer 
to have an observable effect on outcomes than private R&D, as it is further upstream from the 
final commercialized product.  At the same time, both private and public R&D are driven by the 
same demand-side influences, such as energy prices and environmental policy. This makes 
disentangling the effect of each difficult.  However, measuring the impact of government R&D is 
important for modeling environmental policy.  Economic theory suggests that that a wedge 
should exist between social and private returns to R&D.  Government R&D aims, at least in part, 
to close this gap.  However, there is little empirical evidence specifically on the returns to 
government R&D, nor to the extent to which government R&D effectively closes this gap.  This 
is due, in part, to the nature of government projects, which are often more basic and long term in 
nature, making estimating returns difficult.  Given this, estimating the gap between private and 
social rates of return that exist after accounting for both private and public energy R&D spending 
is an important area for future research 
                                                 
10 The two laboratories are Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory. 23 
 
Economists also have much to contribute to the estimation of learning curves for energy 
technologies.  In the economic literature, these models focus on experience within a single 
production process, such as the falling costs of production for Liberty ships during World War II 
(Rapping, 1965) or successive generations of silicon chips (Irwin and Klenow, 1994).  In 
contrast, most of the learning curve studies using energy data make use of more aggregate 
industry-level data.  That is, they ask how the cost of energy from new installations falls as 
cumulative experience in the industry increases.  However, it need not be the case that users are 
directly learning from their own experiences.  While research on learning curves suggests that 
energy technology costs do fall over time, only a few studies, cited in section 3.2.2, address the 
sources of these cost savings.  Understanding the source of these savings has important 
implications for policy timing.  If experience itself is important—and there are spillovers to other 
firms—one could argue that environmental policy should encourage early adoption of 
technology, to take advantage of the learning effects that follow. If, instead, cost savings are the 
result of R&D and other purposeful research efforts, policy should first attempt to encourage 
these activities, so as lower the eventual costs of environmental policy.  Moreover, learning is 
not just a matter for estimating cost savings, but also affects adoption as well, as cumulative 
usage lowers the cost of adoption.  Disentangling the cause and effect of the relationship between 
experience, R&D, and other factors that drive cost reductions is a fruitful topic for future 
research.   
 
4. Microeconomics: Diffusion 
Technological advances are of little use unless society ultimately makes use of the 
innovation through technology diffusion, that is, the process by which a new technology 
penetrates the relevant market.  Often times, a technology that appears to surpass competing 
technologies in performance and cost will not immediately be chosen over existing technologies.  
A key question is whether this slow diffusion is a result of rational actors responding to varying 
incentives or due to market inefficiencies.  In this section we briefly review the literature on 
diffusion of environmental technologies.
11  We focus on two key questions. One is the time lag 
between invention and adoption, focusing on the adoption of technologies within a single 
market.  Second is the flow of knowledge across regions.   
 
4.1 Diffusion within Countries 
The diffusion of a new technology is a gradual, dynamic process.  New technologies are 
not adopted en masse.  Rather, adoption usually begins with a few early adopters, followed by a 
more rapid period of adoption, with the rate of adoption leveling off once most potential users 
have adopted the technology.  This process generates the well-known S-shaped diffusion curve: 
the rate of adoption rises slowly at first, speeds up, and then levels off as market saturation 
approaches.  Early attempts to explain this process focused on the spread of information 
(epidemic models, such as Griliches 1957) and differences among firms (probit models, such as 
David 1969).  More recently, researchers combine these explanations while adding potential 
strategic decisions of firms.   These papers find that firm-specific differences explain most 
                                                 
11 Stoneman and Battisti (2008) provide a more general review of the economics of diffusion. 24 
 
variation in adoption rates, suggesting that gradual diffusion is a rational process in response to 
varying incentives faced by individual actors.   
Environmental technologies can be different, however.  Incentives to adopt end-of-pipe 
technologies that only serve to reduce emissions must come from environmental regulation.   
Therefore, it is not surprising that studies addressing adoption of environmental technologies 
find that regulations dominate all other firm-specific factors.  In contrast, energy efficiency and 
fuel-saving technologies may be adopted more slowly, as it is cost savings, rather than a direct 
regulatory requirement, that often matters.  This can be influenced by policies that raise energy 
prices.  However, to the extent that fuel prices do not capture the external costs of energy use, 
such as carbon emissions, energy prices alone will not encourage a socially optimal level of 
adoption for energy efficiency technologies. 
Studies of the diffusion of environmental technologies within countries focus on two 
main questions.  First, what is the theoretical and empirical potential for “induced diffusion” of 
lower-emissions technologies? Specifically, how do environmental policy instruments that 
implicitly or explicitly increase the economic incentive to reduce emissions affect the diffusion 
rate of these technologies?  Second, to what extent have market failures in energy and equipment 
markets limited historical diffusion rates of energy efficient technologies?  The observation that 
energy-efficient technologies that are cost-effective at current prices are diffusing only slowly 
dates back to the 1970s, having been identified as a “paradox” at least as far back as Shama 
(1983).  To the extent that diffusion is limited by market failures, policy measures that simply 
increase the economic incentive to adopt environmentally-friendly technologies will be 
insufficient. In addition, policies focused directly on the correction of adoption market failures 
can be justified.   
 
4.1.1. Theoretical Analyses  
The predominant theoretical framework for analyses of diffusion effects has been what 
could be called the “discrete technology choice” model:  firms contemplate the use of a certain 
technology which reduces marginal costs of pollution abatement and which has a known fixed 
cost associated with it.  While some authors have presented this approach as a model of 
“innovation,” it is more appropriately viewed as a model of adoption. 
With such models, several theoretical studies have found that the incentive for the 
adoption of new technologies is greater under market-based instruments than under direct 
regulation (Zerbe 1970;  Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Prince 1989; Jung et al. 1996).  
With the exception of Downing and White (1986), all of these studies examined the gross 
impacts of alternative policy instruments on the quantity of technology adoption.  
Theoretical comparisons among market-based instruments have produced only limited 
agreement. In a frequently-cited article, Milliman and Prince (1989) examine firm-level 
incentives for technology diffusion provided by five instruments:  command-and-control; 
emission taxes; abatement subsidies; freely-allocated emission permits, and auctioned emission 
permits.  Firm-level incentives for adoption in this representative-firm model were pictured as 
the consequent change in producer surplus.  They found that auctioned permits would provide 
the largest adoption incentive of any instrument, with emissions taxes and subsidies second, and 
freely allocated permits and direct controls last. The Milliman and Prince (1989) study was 25 
 
criticized by Marin (1991) because of its assumption of identical firms, but it was subsequently 
shown that the results remain largely unchanged with heterogeneous abatement costs (Milliman 
and Prince 1992). 
Jung et al. (1996) build on Milliman and Prince's basic framework for comparing the 
effects of alternative policy instruments, but rather than focusing on firm-level changes in 
producer surplus, they considered heterogeneous firms, and modeled the “market-level 
incentive” created by various instruments.   Their rankings echoed those of Milliman and Prince 
(1989):  auctioned permits provided the greatest incentive, followed by taxes and subsidies, free 
permits, and performance standards. 
Subsequent theoretical analyses (Parry 1998; Denicolò 1999; Fischer et al. 2003) clarify 
several aspects of these rankings.  First, there is the question of relative firm-level incentives to 
adopt a new, cost-saving technology when the price of pollution (permit price or tax level) is 
endogenous.  Milliman and Prince (1989), as well as Jung et al. (1996), argue that auctioned 
permits would provide greater incentives for diffusion than freely-allocated permits, because 
technology diffusion lowers the equilibrium permit price, bringing greater aggregate benefits of 
adoption in a regime where all sources are permit buyers (that is, auctions).  But when 
technology diffusion lowers the market price for tradable permits, all firms benefit from this 
lower price regardless of whether or not they adopt the given technology (Fischer et al. 2003).  
Thus, if firms are price takers in the permit market, auctioned permits provide no more adoption 
incentive than freely-allocated permits.  
The overall result is that both auctioned and freely-allocated permits have lesser diffusion 
incentives than and emission tax (but superior to command-and-control instruments).  Under 
tradable permits, technology diffusion lowers the equilibrium permit price, thereby reducing the 
incentive for participating firms to adopt.  Thus, a permit system provides a lower adoption 
incentive than a tax, assuming the two instruments are equivalent before diffusion occurs 
(Denicolò 1999). See, however, the discussion of Fischer et al. (2003) in section 3.1.2; they find 
that an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments with regard to innovation incentives is not 
possible. 
More broadly, it appears that an unambiguous exhaustive ranking of instruments is not 
possible on the basis of theory alone.  Parry (1998) finds that the welfare gain induced by an 
emissions tax is significantly greater than that induced by tradable permits only in the case of 
very major innovations.  Similarly, Requate (1998) includes an explicit model of the final output 
market, and finds that whether (auctioned) permits or taxes provide stronger incentives to adopt 
an improved technology depends upon empirical values of relevant parameters.  
Furthermore, complete theoretical analysis of the effects of alternative policy instruments 
on the rate of technological change must include modeling of the government’s response to 
technological change, because the degree to which regulators respond to technologically-induced 
changes in abatement costs affects the magnitude of the adoption incentive associated with 
alternative policy instruments.   Because technology diffusion presumably lowers the aggregate 
marginal abatement cost function, it results in a change in the efficient level of control.  Hence, 
following diffusion, the optimal agency response is to set a more ambitious target.  Milliman and 
Prince (1989) examine the incentives facing private industry, under alternative policy 
instruments, to oppose such policy changes.  They conclude that firms will oppose optimal 26 
 
agency adjustment of the policy under all instruments except taxes.  Under an emissions tax, the 
optimal agency response to cost-reducing technological change is to lower the tax rate (assuming 
convex damages); under a subsidy, the optimal response is to lower the subsidy; under tradable 
permit systems, the optimal response is to decrease the number of available permits, and thereby 
drive up the permit price.  Thus, firms have clear incentives to support the optimal agency 
response only under an emissions tax regime. 
In a comparison of tradable permits and pollution taxes, Biglaiser et al. (1995) examine 
these instruments’ ability to achieve the first-best outcome in a dynamic setting.   They find that 
effluent taxes can do so, but permits cannot.  With an effluent tax, the optimal tax is presumably 
determined by marginal damages (which the authors assume to be constant), yielding a policy 
which is time consistent.  Whether or not firms adopt a cost-saving technology, the government 
has no incentive to change the tax rate.  From this perspective, however, tradable permits are not 
time consistent, because the optimal number of permits in each period depends on both firms’ 
costs, which are determined by all previous investments, and marginal damages.  With constant 
marginal damages, and marginal abatement costs decreasing over time, the optimal number of 
permits should also be decreasing over time.  Firms may internalize this, and thereby invest less 
than optimally in pollution control technology. 
The result of Biglaiser et al. (1995) depends, however, on the assumption of constant 
marginal damages.  If marginal damages are not constant, then the optimal policy is determined 
by the interaction of marginal damages and marginal abatement costs for both taxes and permits.  
The result appears to be analogous to Weitzman's (1974) rule:  if the marginal damage curve is 
relatively flat and there is uncertainty in marginal costs (from the regulator's perspective) due to 
potential innovation at the firm level, then a price instrument is more efficient. 
 
4.1.2. Empirical Studies 
Most empirical studies of environmental technology adoption focus on one of two 
questions.  First are studies examining the relationship between environmental policy and 
adoption.  Many of these focus on adoption of pollution control techniques.  A common finding 
in this literature is that environmental regulation is necessary to encourage adoption of pollution 
control techniques.  Second are studies asking whether adoption eventually reaches socially 
efficient levels, or if market failures hinder the adoption of environmentally-friendly 
technologies.  These studies primarily focus on the adoption of energy efficiency technologies. 
 
4.1.2.1 Environmental Policy and Adoption 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 provides a summary of empirical studies on the adoption of environmental 
technologies.  Kerr and Newell (2003) use a duration model to analyze the influence of plant 
characteristics and the stringency and the form of regulation on technology adoption decisions by 
petroleum refineries during the leaded gasoline phasedown.  They find that increased regulatory 
stringency (which raised the effective price of lead) encouraged greater adoption of lead-
reducing technology. They also find that larger and more technically sophisticated refineries, 
which had lower costs of adoption, were more likely to adopt the new technology.  Related to the 27 
 
choice of policy instruments, Kerr and Newell find that the tradable permit system provided 
incentives for more efficient technology adoption decisions, as evidenced by a significant 
divergence in the adoption behavior of refineries with low versus high compliance costs. 
Namely, the positive differential in the adoption propensity of expected permit sellers (i.e., low-
cost refineries) relative to expected permit buyers (i.e., high-cost refineries) was significantly 
greater under market-based lead regulation compared to under individually binding performance 
standards. 
Another prominent application of tradable permit systems which has provided an 
opportunity for empirical analysis of the effects of policy instruments on technology diffusion is 
the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program, initiated under the U.S. Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1990.  In an econometric analysis, Keohane (2007) finds evidence of the way in 
which the increased flexibility of a market-based instrument can provide greater incentives for 
technology adoption.  In particular, he finds that the choice of whether or not to adopt a 
“scrubber” to remove sulfur dioxide — rather than purchasing (more costly) low-sulfur coal — 
was more sensitive to cost differences (between scrubbing and fuel-switching) under the tradable 
permit system than under the earlier emissions rate standard.    
In an examination of the effects of alternative policy instruments for reducing oxygen-
demanding water pollutants, Kemp (1998) finds that effluent charges were a significant predictor 
of adoption of biological treatment by facilities.  In earlier work, Purvis and Outlaw (1995) carry 
out a case study of EPA’s permitting process for acceptable water-pollution control technologies 
in the U.S. livestock production sector.  Those authors conclude that the relevant regulations 
encouraged the use of “time-tested” technologies that provided lower levels of environmental 
protection than other more innovative ones, simply because producers knew that EPA was more 
likely to approve a permit that employed the established approach. 
Snyder et al. (2003) study the diffusion of membrane-cell technology in the chlorine 
manufacturing industry. Chlorine is produced using an electrolytic process.  Of the three types of 
cells that can be used in this process, membrane cells have the least environmental impact.  
Usage of membrane cells have increased over time, due to three different processes: adoption of 
the technology at existing plants, use of membrane technology at new facilities, and the closing 
of plants using older cell technologies.  Using a hazard model, Snyder et al. look at both the 
adoption and exit decisions of chlorine plants.  They find that increases in the percentage of 
plants using membrane technology comes partially from adoption, but primarily from shutdowns 
of older plants.  Environmental regulation does not have a statistically significant effect on 
adoption of membrane technology.  However, the passage of more stringent regulations over 
time does appear to hasten the shutdown of older facilities, thus increasing the share of plants 
using membrane technology. 
Popp (2006d) links the role of innovation and adoption in a study of NOX pollution 
control technologies.  Advances (and expected advances) in a single technology should affect 
both its adoption rate and the adoption of substitute technologies.  Popp combines plant-level 
data on U.S. coal-fired electric power plants with patent data pertaining to NOX pollution control 
techniques to study this link.  Plants needing to reduce NOX emissions face two choices. They 
can modify the combustion process so as to produce fewer NOX emissions, or they can install 
post-combustion treatment to remove NOX from the emissions stream.  Modifying the 
combustion process is cheaper, but post-combustion treatment reduces a greater percentage of 28 
 
NOX emissions.  As in other studies of environmental technologies, the effect of other 
explanatory variables is dominated by the effect of environmental regulations, demonstrating that 
the mere presence of environmental technologies is not enough to encourage its usage.   
Technological advances are important for the adoption of existing combustion modification 
technologies.  However, these advances are less important for the adoption of newer post-
combustion control techniques, which are adopted only when needed to comply with the strictest 
emission limits.  Moreover, because of the greater capital costs for post-combustion techniques, 
the financial strength of a plant’s parent company positively influences adoption.  
In general, firms can choose one of two strategies to comply with environmental 
regulations.  End-of-the-pipe abatement reduces emissions by using add-on technologies to clean 
the waste stream coming from a plant.  In contrast, cleaner production methods reduce emissions 
by generating less pollution in the production process.  Frondel et al. (2007) look at the factors 
influencing the choice of one strategy over the other.  They find that many plants in OECD 
nations make use of cleaner production methods.  However, environmental regulations are more 
likely to lead to the adoption of end-of-the-pipe techniques.  In contrast, market forces such as 
cost savings or environmental audits lead to the adoption of cleaner production processes. 
Another body of research has examined the effects on technology diffusion of command-
and-control environmental standards when they are combined with “differential environmental 
regulations.”  In many situations where command-and-control standards have been used, the 
required level of pollution abatement has been set at a far more stringent level for new sources 
than for existing ones.  There is empirical evidence that such differential environmental 
regulations have lengthened the time before plants were retired (Maloney and Brady 1988; 
Nelson et al. 1993).  Further, this dual system can actually worsen pollution by encouraging 
firms to keep older, dirtier plants in operation (Stewart 1981; Gollop and Roberts 1983; 
McCubbins et al. 1989).   
Another concern with differential environmental regulation is that existing plants may 
forego investments that could lead to more stringent regulatory requirements.  However, recent 
work by Wolfram and Bushnell (2008) suggest that the impact of this effect may be small.  They 
analyze the effects of New Source Review (NSR) environmental regulations on coal-fired 
electric power plants.  The 1970 Clean Air Act required new electric generating plants to install 
costly pollution control equipment, but exempted existing plants with a grandfathering clause. 
Existing plants lost their grandfathering status if they made major modifications to their plants. 
Wolfram and Bushnell find some evidence that the risk of NSR enforcement reduced capital 
expenditures at plants. However, they find no discernable effect on the operating costs, fuel 
efficiency or emissions of these plants. 
The regulatory structure of markets may also affect adoption.  Fowlie (2007) examines 
the adoption of NOX pollution control techniques by U.S. power plants in response to NOX 
permit trading in the eastern United States.  Fowlie notes that electric utilities face different 
incentives depending on the regulatory structure of the industry.  She considers how differences 
in the regulatory structure of an industry affect the response to pollution permits. State regulators 
typically allow firms to recoup the average costs of operating pollution controls and purchasing 
permits.  However, the opportunity costs of using or holding permits is not reflected in regulated 
rates. This gives regulated firms an incentive to invest in more capital intensive abatement 
equipment.  In contrast, utilities in restructured markets face greater uncertainty, making 29 
 
investments in long-term pollution abatement capital more risky.  Using plant-level data on the 
cost of installing various NOX abatement techniques, Fowlie finds that plants in restructured 
electricity markets are less likely to install capital intensive compliance options.  Moreover, 
because the regulatory framework faced by utilities varies by state, the interaction between state 
utility regulation and permit markets has important environmental effects.  As a result of 
different adoption incentives faced by deregulated utilities, a larger share of the pollution 
allowed by NOX permits is emitted in states with more severe air quality problems. 
In addition to economic incentives, direct regulation, and information provision, some 
research has emphasized the role that “informal regulation” or community pressure can play in 
encouraging the adoption of environmentally clean technologies.  For example, in an analysis of 
fuel adoption decisions for traditional brick kilns in Mexico, Blackman and Bannister (1998) 
suggest that community pressure applied by competing firms and local non-governmental 
organizations was associated with increased adoption of cleaner fuels, even when those fuels had 
relatively high variable costs.  Popp et al (2008) find that consumer concerns over dioxin found 
in the wastewater of pulp manufacturers helped spur the adoption of low-chlorine and chlorine-
free bleaching techniques at pulp plants, even before regulations requiring such techniques took 
effect.  An important difference between the technological choice here is that chlorine use not 
only has negative environmental impacts near the production site, but also affects the quality of 
the final product.  Consumer concerns are more likely to be an issue when environmental choices 
affect product quality, such as chlorine in paper products or lead paint in children’s toys. 
Not surprisingly, prices also serve as an incentive for adoption.  This is particularly 
important for technologies that improve energy efficiency, as individual users can appropriate 
some of the benefits of these technologies through lower energy bills, even if no other regulatory 
incentives exist.  Rose and Joskow (1990) find a positive effect of fuel price increases on the 
adoption of a new fuel-saving technology in the U.S. electricity-generation sector, with the 
statistical significance of the effect depending on the year of the fuel price.  In a tobit analysis of 
steel plant adoption of different furnace technologies, Boyd and Karlson (1993) find a significant 
positive effect of increases in a fuel’s price on the adoption of technology that saves that fuel, 
although the magnitude of the effect was modest. For a sample of industrial plants in four 
heavily polluting sectors (petroleum refining, plastics, pulp and paper, and steel), Pizer et al. 
(2001) find that both energy prices and financial health were positively related to the adoption of 
energy-saving technologies. 
Finally, the energy crises of the 1970s gave rise to several studies addressing automotive 
energy efficiency.  Most relevant for our purposes is the study of Greene (1990).  He uses data 
on fuel prices and fuel economy of automobiles from 1978 to 1989 to test the relative 
effectiveness of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and gasoline prices in 
increasing fuel economy.  He finds that the big three U.S. firms faced a binding CAFE 
constraint, and for these firms compliance with CAFE standards had roughly twice the impact on 
fuel economy as did fuel prices.  Japanese firms, however, did not face a binding CAFE 
constraint, and fuel prices had only a small effect. Luxury European manufactures seemed to 
base their fuel efficiency largely on market demand and often exceeded CAFE requirements.  
For these firms, neither the standards nor prices seemed to have much effect.  Similarly, 
Goldberg (1998) combines a demand-side model of discrete vehicle choice and utilization with a 
supply-side model of oligopoly and product differentiation to estimate the effects of CAFE 30 
 
standards on the fuel economy of the new car fleet.  She finds that automobile fuel operating 
costs have had a significant effect, although a gasoline tax of a magnitude that could match the 
effect of CAFE on fuel economy would have to be very large. 
 
4.1.2.2. Are there Adoption Market Failures? 
Whereas environmental policy is generally a prerequisite for adoption of pollution 
control techniques, there are private benefits to adopting energy efficient technology, such as 
lower energy bills.  Nonetheless, there is a large literature documenting that such technologies 
are adopted at seemingly slow rates, even when the upfront capital costs of technology would be 
paid back in a few years.  Assessing the reasons for this slow diffusion process has been an 
important research question, as has the evaluation of policies that seek to increase energy 
efficiency. In a retrospective review of past energy-efficiency programs in the United States, 
Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2006) found that the programs reviewed (e.g., appliance 
standards, utility programs) cumulatively reduced total U.S. energy use by at most 4 percent, or 
12 percent as a percent of energy use in buildings. The cost-effectiveness of these programs has 
been the subject of considerable debate.  Table 5 provides a summary of research in this area. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Jaffe and Stavins (1995) carry out econometric analyses of the factors affecting the 
adoption of thermal insulation technologies in new residential construction in the United States 
between 1979 and 1988.  They examine the dynamic effects of energy prices and technology 
adoption costs on average residential energy-efficiency technologies in new home construction, 
finding the response of mean energy efficiency to energy price changes to be positive and 
significant, both statistically and economically.  Interestingly, they also find that equivalent 
percentage adoption cost changes were about three times as effective as energy price changes in 
encouraging adoption, although standard financial analysis would suggest they ought to be about 
equal in percentage terms.  This finding offers confirmation for the conventional wisdom that 
technology adoption decisions are more sensitive to up-front cost considerations than to longer-
term operating expenses. One interpretation of this finding is that energy price changes are 
simply not expected to persist, so that a given percentage change in today’s energy price has a 
relatively small effect on the expected “average” energy price over the life of the investment.  
This possibility has implications for the challenge of devising effective policy to encourage 
innovation where the returns to the innovation depend on future prices. Jaffe and Stavins (1995) 
also examine the effects of more conventional regulations on technology diffusion, in the form of 
state building codes.  They find no discernable effects.  It is unclear to what extent this is due to 
inability to measure the true variation across states in the effectiveness of codes, or to codes that 
were in many cases not binding relative to typical practice. This is a reminder, however, that 
although price-based policies will always have some effect, standards may have little effect if 
they are set below existing standards of practice. 
Hassett and Metcalf (1995) find an even larger discrepancy between the effect of changes 
in installation cost (here coming through tax credits) and changes in energy prices.  Anderson 
and Newell (2004) also find a divergence in their investigation of industrial energy efficiency 
audits (discussed below)—albeit a much lesser one—with costs have a 40% greater percentage 
effect relative to future energy savings. There are three interrelated possible explanations for 31 
 
these findings.  One possibility is a behavioral bias that causes purchasers to focus more on up-
front cost than they do on the lifetime operating costs of an investment.  As discussed above, an 
alternative (but probably indistinguishable) view is that purchasers focus equally on both, but 
uncertainty about future energy prices makes them give less weight to the current energy price 
(which is only an indicator of future prices) than they do to the capital cost, which is known.  A 
final interpretation might be that consumers actually have reasonably accurate expectations about 
future energy prices, and their decisions reflect those expectations, but our empirical proxies for 
their expectations are not correct. 
In a separate analysis of thermal home insulation, this one in the Netherlands, Kemp 
(1997) finds that a threshold model of diffusion (based on a rational choice approach) could not 
explain observed diffusion patterns.  Instead, epidemic models provided a better fit to the data.  
Kemp also finds that there was no significant effect of government subsidies on the adoption of 
thermal insulation by households. 
Attention has also been given to the effects on energy-efficiency technology diffusion of 
voluntary environmental programs.  Howarth et al. (2000) examine two voluntary programs of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency – the Green Lights and Energy Star programs – both 
of which are intended to encourage greater private industry use of energy-saving technologies.  
A natural question from economics is why would firms carry out additional technology 
investments as part of a voluntary agreement?  The authors respond that there are a set of agency 
problems that inhibit economically wise adoption of some technologies. For example, most 
energy-saving investments are small, and senior staff may rationally choose to restrict funds for 
small projects that cannot be perfectly monitored.  The Green Lights program may be said to 
attempt to address this type of agency problem by providing information on savings 
opportunities at the level of the firm where decisions are made.  
For households and small firms, adoption of new technologies with significant capital 
costs may be constrained by inadequate access to financing. And in some countries, import 
barriers may inhibit the adoption of technology embodied in foreign-produced goods (Reppelin-
Hill 1999). On the other hand, Nijkamp et al. (2001) present the qualitative results of a survey of 
Dutch firms regarding their decisions on how much to invest in energy-efficient technologies.  
They found that standard economic “barriers” to energy-efficient technology adoption – 
including the existence of alternative investments, low energy costs, and a desire to replace 
capital only when it is fully depreciated – are more important than financial barriers and 
uncertainty about future technologies and prices. 
Information plays an important role in the technology diffusion process.  There are two 
reasons why the importance of information may result in market failure.  First, information is a 
public good that may be expected in general to be underprovided by markets.  Second, to the 
extent that the adoption of the technology by some users is itself an important mode of 
information transfer to other parties, adoption creates a positive externality and is therefore likely 
to proceed at a socially suboptimal rate.  Howarth et al. (2000) explore the significance of 
inadequate information in inhibiting the diffusion of more efficient lighting equipment.  Metcalf 
and Hassett (1999) compare available estimates of energy savings from new equipment to actual 
savings realized by users who have installed the equipment.  They find that actual savings, while 
significant, were less than those promised by engineers and product manufacturers.  Their 
estimate of the median realized rate of return is about 12%, which they found to be close to a 32 
 
discount rate for this investment implied by a CAPM analysis. 
Anderson and Newell (2004) examine the role of information by asking how firms 
respond to energy audits offered through the US Department of Energy’s Industrial Assessment 
Centers (IAC).  This program has offered energy assessments at no cost to small and medium-
sized manufacturers since 1976.  Data on both the recommendations made and projects 
implemented within 2 years of the evaluation are kept by the IAC.  Using these data, Anderson 
and Newell note that firms adopted only 53 percent of recommended projects, even though the 
average payback time for these projects was just 1.29 years.  Using fixed effect logit estimation, 
they find that adoption rates are higher for projects with shorter paybacks, lower costs, greater 
annual savings, higher energy prices, and greater energy conservation.  As discussed above, 
plants are 40 percent more responsive to initial costs than annual energy savings. Using multiple 
decisions for a given firms, they estimate a “payback threshold” for a typical firm, below which 
all projects are adopted and above which all projects are rejected. They find that over 98 percent 
of firms have payback thresholds of less than five years, with a median payback threshold of just 
1.2 years. As in previous studies, these firms demand quick paybacks of 1–2 years (implicit 
hurdle rates of 50–100%) for project adoption. These results are consistent with the investment 
criteria that small and medium-size firms typically state that they intend to use (Lefley 1996).  
Also related to imperfect information are a variety of agency problems that can inhibit the 
adoption of superior technology.  The agency problem can be either external or internal to 
organizations.  An example of an external agency problem would be a landlord/tenant 
relationship, in which a tenant pays for utilities but the landlord makes decisions regarding which 
appliances to purchase, or vice versa.  Internal agency problems can arise in organizations where 
the individual or department responsible for equipment purchase or maintenance differs from the 
individual or department whose budget covers utility costs.  DeCanio (1998) explores the 
significance of organizational factors in explaining firms’ perceived returns to installation of 
energy-efficient lighting.  
Uncertainty is another factor that may limit the adoption of new technology (Geroski 
2000). Uncertainty can be inherent in the technology itself, in the sense that its newness means 
that users are not sure how it will be perform (Mansfield 1968).  For resource-saving technology, 
there is the additional uncertainty that the economic value of such savings depends on future 
resource prices, which are themselves uncertain.  This uncertainty about future returns means 
that there is an “option value” associated with postponing the adoption of new technology 
(Pindyck 1991; Hassett and Metcalf 1995, 1996). 
Closely related to the issue of uncertainty is the issue of the discount rate or investment 
hurdle rate used by purchasers in evaluating the desirability of new technology, particularly 
resource-conserving technology.  A large body of research demonstrates that purchasers appear 
to use relatively high discount rates in evaluating energy-efficiency investments (Hausman 1979; 
Ruderman et al. 1987; Ross 1990).  The implicit or explicit use of relatively high discount rates 
for energy savings does not represent a market failure in itself; it is rather the manifestation of 
underlying aspects of the decision process including those just discussed.  At least some portion 
of the discount rate premium is likely to be related to uncertainty, although the extent to which 
the premium can be explained by uncertainty and option value is subject to debate (Hassett and 
Metcalf 1995, 1996; Sanstad et al. 1995).  Capital market failures that make it difficult to secure 
external financing for these investments may also play a role.  33 
 
Finally, the presence of increasing returns in the form of learning effects, network 
externalities, or other positive adoption externalities presents the possibility that market 
outcomes for technologies exhibiting these features, including those with environmental 
consequences, may be inefficient.  For example, the idea that we are “locked into” a fossil-fuel-
based energy system is a recurring theme in policy discussions regarding climate change and 
other energy-related environmental problems.  At a more aggregate level, there has been much 
discussion of the question of whether it is possible for developing countries to take less 
environmentally-damaging paths of development than have currently industrialized countries, for 
example by relying less on fossil fuels.  In a theoretical study, Mulder et al. (2003) use a vintage 
model to consider the adoption of energy efficiency technologies. They assume 
complementarities among technologies, so that there are returns to using technologies from a mix 
of vintages.  This complementarity allows old technologies to persist, offering a possible 
explanation for the energy efficiency paradox. As complementarities increase, adoption levels of 
technology decrease.  Finally, they introduce learning by doing into the model.  This further 
reduces the adoption level of new technologies, as firms lose their expertise on past vintages 
when choosing a new technology.  
While the empirical literature is quite thin, some studies have explored the issue of 
increasing returns and technology lock-in for competing technologies within the energy and 
environment arenas, including analysis of renewable energy and fossil fuels (Cowan and Kline 
1996), the internal combustion engine and alternatively-fueled vehicles (Cowan and Hulten 
1996), pesticides and integrated pest management (Cowan and Gunby 1996), technologies for 
electricity generation (Islas 1997), nuclear power reactor designs (Cowan 1990), and the 
transition from hydrocarbon-based fuels (Kemp 1997). 
 
4.1.3 What Can Technological Change Economists Contribute? 
Much of the discussion on the energy paradox focuses on whether or not there are market 
failures that slow adoption.  One area in which technological change economists could contribute 
is to move beyond the focus on market failures.  For example, a micro and behavioral 
understanding of the decision to adopt could result from a marriage of the economics of 
technological change with the new “behavioral economics.”  Such work would contribute to our 
understanding of why adoption of energy efficiency technologies is slow, and would better 
inform policy makers attempts to increase adoption of energy efficient technologies.  
  
4.2 Diffusion Across Countries 
While international technology transfer has received much attention in the broader 
economic literature, few applications focus specifically on environmental technologies.
12  Nearly 
all of the papers cited so far focus on highly developed economies.  This is not surprising, as 
these countries were the first to enact environmental protections and most R&D expenditures 
occur in these countries.  In 2006, global R&D expenditures were about $960 billion, with 85 
percent of this R&D occurring in the OECD, and half in the United States and Japan alone 
                                                 
12 For a general review of the literature on international technology transfer, see Keller (2004). 34 
 
(Newell 2008a, OECD 2008).  
Nonetheless, diffusion of environmental technologies, particularly to developing 
countries, is currently one of the most pressing environmental concerns.  Much of this concern 
stems from the need to address climate change, while allowing for economic development.   
Rapid economic growth in countries such as China and India not only increases current carbon 
emissions from these countries, but results in high emission growth rates from these countries as 
well.  In 1990, China and India accounted for 13 percent of world carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions.  By 2004, that figure had risen to 22 percent, and it is projected to rise to 31 percent 
by 2030 (Energy Information Administration, 2007).  Given these concerns, designing policy 
that encourages the transfer of clean technologies to developing countries has been a major 
discussion point in climate negotiations. Currently, the Kyoto agreement includes the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows polluters in industrialized countries with 
emission constraints to receive credit for financing projects that reduce emissions in developing 
countries, which do not face emission constraints under the Kyoto Protocol.
13  Because carbon 
emissions are a global public good, CDM can help developed countries reach emission targets at 
a lower total cost, by allowing developed country firms to substitute cheaper emissions 
reductions in developing countries for more expensive reductions in the home country.  For 
developing countries, technology transfer and diffusion of clean technologies may be an 
additional benefit from CDM. 
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008) study this question, asking how many CDM projects transfer 
“hardware”, such as equipment or machinery, as opposed to “software”, which they consider to 
be knowledge, skills, or know-how.  That is, how often do CDM projects transfer knowledge and 
skills that not only allow a developed country investor to meet emission reduction credits, but 
also enable the recipient developing country to make continual improvements to their own 
emission levels?  Dechezleprêtre et al. look at 644 CDM projects registered by the Executive 
Board of the UNFCCC.  They find that 279 projects, or 43%, involve technology transfer.
14  Of 
these, 57 transfer equipment, 101 transfer knowledge, and 121 transfer both equipment and 
knowledge.  A project is more likely to include technology transfer if it is larger, if the project 
developer is a subsidiary of a company in a developed country, and if the project includes one or 
more carbon credit buyers.  Before credits for a project can be sold, the emission reductions must 
be certified.  Because they have an interest in obtaining emission credits, credit buyers help to 
facilitate this process. 
Most economic applications of environmental technology transfer have been more 
general.  In the broadest sense, environmental technological change is addressed in literature on 
trade and the environment.  There, economists decompose the effect of international trade on 
environmental quality in developing countries into three components.  First, scale effects account 
for increased pollution levels due to the greater wealth and increased economic activity that 
follows international trade.  Second, composition effects refer to reductions in pollution resulting 
from a preference for cleaner goods that develops as countries become richer.  Third, technique 
effects refer to emission reductions that occur because trade expands access to cleaner 
technologies (Esty 2001, Copeland and Taylor 2003).  Attempts to identify this technique effect 
                                                 
13 Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) provide a description of the Clean Development Mechanism. 
14 However, these projects are among the most significant CDM projects, as they account for 84% of the expected 
emissions reductions from registered CDM projects. 35 
 
can be seen as examples of technology transfer.   
Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2006) consider the interaction of scale and technique effects in a 
simulation of increased science and technology (S&T) capabilities and energy use in China.  
They note that improving S&T capabilities has two offsetting effects.  While technological 
development can lead to the use of cleaner technologies (the technique effect), increases in S&T 
also lead to larger energy intensive industries (the scale effect).  Their paper simulates the effect 
of S&T growth in China, with R&D intensity reaching 2.5% by 2020, as stated in China’s long-
term policy goals.  They note that China’s R&D intensity has already increased from 0.6% in 
1996 to 1.3% in 2003.  Calibrating their model based on econometric results from 1500 
industrial enterprises, they find that the S&T takeoff should have an energy-saving bias, resulting 
in lower energy prices.  However, this leads to more economic growth and greater energy 
consumption by households, so that the net effect of the S&T takeoff is greater energy use and 
more carbon emissions.  Fisher-Vanden and Sue Wing (2008) develop an analytical model that 
finds similar results. 
Khanna and Zilberman (2001) illustrate the importance of trade to diffusion in a study of 
the adoption of energy efficient technologies at electric power plants in India.  As is typical in 
adoption models, variations in the adoption of these technologies occur due to differences across 
heterogeneous plants.  Emissions could be reduced by the adoption of high quality coal.   
However, such coal would need to be imported.  In an effort to protect the domestic coal 
industry, such imports were virtually banned by the Indian government.  Khanna and Zilberman 
find that while an emissions tax is necessary to achieve optimal levels of abatement, simply 
removing domestic and trade policy distortions would increase adoption of energy efficient 
technology and potentially decrease carbon emissions. 
Focusing more directly on the invention and diffusion of environmental technologies, 
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) use patent data from the US, Japan, Germany, and 14 low-and 
middle-income countries to study technological change for a variety of environmentally-friendly 
technologies.  They find that environmentally-friendly innovation increases as pollution 
abatement cost expenditures in the country increase.  For the US, Japan, and Germany, the 
majority of these patents are typically domestic patents.  For the developing countries, the 
majority of these patents come from foreign countries, highlighting the importance of diffusion.  
This is especially true of air pollution control technologies, which are typically complex.  In 
contrast, while air pollution patents in developing countries go primarily to developed country 
inventors, water pollution control technologies are more frequently local innovations, as local 
conditions affect the potential benefits of such technologies.  However, these innovations are less 
likely to be patented elsewhere.  Lanjouw and Mody also find that policies in one nation may 
affect innovation of technologies in a second nation.  For example, they note that the majority of 
vehicle air emissions patents granted in the U.S. are from foreign nations, even though the 
United States was the first country to adopt strict emissions standards.   
Popp (2006b) addresses the links between regulations and innovations across countries, 
using patent data to study innovation on air pollution control technologies for coal-fired power 
plants in the U.S., Japan, and Germany.  He finds that inventors respond primarily to domestic 
regulatory incentives.  In each country, the largest increase in domestic patent applications 
occurs after the country passes regulations affecting power plants.  Moreover, Popp finds 
evidence of innovation even in countries that adopt regulations late, suggesting that these 36 
 
countries do not simply take advantage of technologies “off the shelf” that have been developed 
elsewhere.  Instead, adaptive R&D seems to be necessary to suit the technology to the local 
market, as these later patents are more likely to cite earlier foreign than domestic inventions.  
Thus, the foreign knowledge serves as blueprints for further improvements, rather than as a 
direct source of technology.   
One reason why foreign markets may have little influence on innovation is that electricity 
is not a traded commodity, and the bulk of emissions control equipment used in these countries 
comes from domestic suppliers.  Note, for example, that this result contrasts with the findings of 
Lanjouw and Mody (1996), who find that U.S. automotive emission regulations in the 1970s lead 
to increased innovation from Japanese and German firms.  Similarly, Popp et al. (2008) show 
that pulp and paper manufacturers respond to the demands of consumers in key export markets 
when adopting cleaner paper bleaching techniques.  Finally, Medhi (2008) finds that Korean 
automotive manufacturers first incorporated advanced emission controls into their vehicles to 
satisfy regulatory requirements in the U.S. and Japanese markets.  It was only after fitting these 
technologies into their vehicles that the Korean government passed their own regulations 
requiring advanced emission controls. 
Because most pollution control technologies are first developed in industrialized 
countries, and because environmental regulations are needed to provide incentives to adopt these 
technologies, Lovely and Popp (2008) focus on the adoption of environmental regulation as the 
first step in the international diffusion of environmental technologies.  They study the adoption 
of regulations limiting emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides at coal-fired power plants 
in 39 countries.  Their sample includes both developed and developing countries.  While the 
adoption of pollution control technologies within a country responds quickly to environmental 
regulation, they find that adoption of the regulations themselves follows the typical S-shaped 
pattern noted in studies of technology diffusion.  In their work, they focus on access to 
technology as an important factor influencing regulatory adoption.  As pollution control 
technologies improve, the costs of abatement, and thus the costs of adopting environmental 
regulation, fall.  As such, they find that, over time, countries adopt environmental regulation at 
lower levels of per capita income.  Moreover, they find that openness to international trade is 
important for providing access to these technologies, providing support for the technique effect 
discussed earlier. 
Hilton (2001) finds that late adopters of regulation can learn from early adopters.  Using 
data on 48 nations, he looks at the time it took each country to eliminate lead from fuel.  This 
time is measured from the time that each country first began phasing out lead in fuel to the time 
in which the country achieved lead levels at or below 0.5 grams of lead per gallon.  Countries 
that began the process after 1979 completed the lead phase-out five years faster, on average, than 
those beginning before 1979.  Moreover, among those countries that did not completely phase 
out lead, countries that begin the phase-out process earlier achieve greater reductions.  Hilton 
concludes with evidence that late adopters are able to move more quickly because they benefit 
from lessons learnt by early adopters. 
Finally, in developing country settings, factors inducing adoption of environmentally 
friendly technology may differ from factors that are important in developed countries.  Blackman 
and Kildegaard (2003) study the adoption of three clean leather tanning technologies in Mexico.  
They use original survey data on a cluster of small- and medium-scale leather tanneries in León, 37 
 
Guanajuato, noting that small and medium scale enterprises often dominate pollution intensive 
industries in developing countries.  To explain the adoption of each tanning technique, they 
estimate a system of multivariate probit models.  They find that a firm’s human capital and stock 
of technical information influence adoption.  They also find that private-sector trade associations 
and input suppliers are important sources of technical information about clean technologies.  In 
contrast to results typically found in developed countries, neither firm size nor regulatory 
pressure are correlated with adoption. 
In contrast to pollution control technologies, energy efficiency technologies will diffuse 
even without environmental policy in place, as they offer users the opportunity of cost savings.  
Fisher-Vanden et al. (2006) use a panel of 22,000 Chinese large and medium enterprises to study 
improvements in energy efficiency.  Between 1997 and 1999, total energy use fell by 17%.  54% 
of this decline can be explained by price changes.  Technological change, measured by firm-level 
R&D, accounts for 17% of this change, and changes in ownership account for another 12%.  
Looking more closely at the role of technological change, they find that imported technology 
saves labor and energy, whereas internal R&D from Chinese firms saves capital and energy.  
They explain this difference by noting that technological change responds to the resource 
scarcities in the country supplying the technology.  They also find that a firm’s in-house 
technological activities are important for creating absorptive capacity needed for successful 
diffusion of imported technology.   
Fisher-Vanden (2003) studies the diffusion of continuous casting technology for steel 
production at 75 Chinese steel firms.  The use of continuous casting has important energy 
implications, as it uses 70% less energy than ingot casting.  Fisher-Vanden finds that while 
centrally managed firms are the first to acquire new technology, locally managed firms complete 
integration of the technology throughout the firm more rapidly. 
Finally, several papers have looked at the intersection of politics and technology transfer. 
Fredriksson and Wolscheid (2008) study the adoption of cleaner steel production technologies 
across countries, measured by the percentage of steel produced using electric arc furnaces.   
While stricter environmental policy does encourage greater adoption of cleaner techniques, they 
surprisingly find that adoption of cleaner technologies is greater in countries with more 
corruption.  They argue that firms in honest countries underinvest in technology in order to 
convince regulators to keep environmental standards weak.  In corrupt countries, firms can invest 
in better technologies, and instead use bribes to weaken environmental regulations. 
Rosendahl (2004) considers the role of learning on optimal environmental taxes across 
countries.  When the benefits of learning extend beyond the firm, optimal environmental taxes 
should be higher, so as to give incentives for providing the positive learning externality.   
Because environmental technologies are first developed in industrialized countries, he argues 
that optimal environmental taxes should be higher in developed countries than developing 
countries, so as to create incentives for learning in developed countries that can then benefit late 
adopters in developing countries. 
Barrett (2006) asks whether a climate change agreement focusing on the development 
and adoption of new technologies could perform better than an agreement focusing on emissions 
reduction.  In general, the answer is no.  However, one exception is when R&D leads to 
breakthrough technologies with increasing returns to scale.  In such a case, the benefits of 38 
 
adopting the new technology would be great enough that the treaty would be self-enforcing.  
Similarly, de Coninck et al. (2008) examine the conceptual arguments and specific options for 
technology-oriented climate agreements aimed at knowledge sharing and coordination, R&D, 
demonstration, and deployment. They find that technology-oriented climate agreements could 
increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of international climate cooperation, but are 
only likely to be successful as a complement to, rather than substitute for, flexible emissions-
based policies. 
Golombek and Hoel (2004) raise the possibility that induced technological change could 
help alleviate the problem of incomplete participation in climate treaties.  The standard 
presumption is that when only some countries commit to reducing carbon emissions, high-carbon 
industries will migrate to non-participating countries, resulting in carbon leakage.  Golombek 
and Hoel note that, in the countries committed to carbon reductions, induced technological 
change will lower abatement costs.  In some cases, these cost reductions will be sufficient to 
encourage non-participating countries to reduce carbon emissions as well.  In Golombek and 
Hoel’s model, R&D is chosen by a central planner.  Di Maria and van der Werf (2008) perform a 
similar analysis, but allow technological change to be truly endogenous, as it is performed by 
profit-maximizing firms.  They show that induced technological change always reduces the rate 
of carbon leakage, although the results depend on assumptions about key elasticities, particularly 
the elasticity of energy supply. Others have also investigated how the nature of global 
environmental problems, technological diffusion, and international trade can provide arguments 
for issues linkage where more countries may participate and comply with international 
agreements on environmental policy and technology policy if they are linked than if they are 
treated separately (see, for example, Folmer and van Mouche 1993, Carraro and Egenhofer 2002, 
and Kemfert 2004).  
Finally, Newell (2008b) considers opportunities for improved and expanded international 
development and transfer of climate technologies. He clarifies the importance of options for 
inducing technology market demand through domestic GHG pricing, international trade, and 
international development assistance, and then turns to upstream innovation strategies, including 
international coordination and funding of climate technology R&D, and knowledge transfer 
through intellectual property. Newell concludes that a successful international effort to accelerate 
and then sustain the rate of development and transfer of GHG mitigation technologies must 
harness a diverse set of markets and institutions beyond those explicitly related to climate, to 
include those for energy, trade, development, and intellectual property.  
 
4.2.1. What Can Technological Change Economists Contribute? 
International diffusion of environmental technologies is an area where much work 
remains to be done.  While there is a broad, more general literature on international technology 
diffusion, specific applications to the environment are few.  However, the lessons from this 
literature, such as documenting links between trade and diffusion, are just beginning to filter into 
environmental economics.  Among the questions waiting to be addressed include the role of 
absorptive capacity.  What must be in place for developing countries to be able to adopt cutting 
edge environmental technologies?  To what extent will developing countries need to adapt these 
innovations to local market conditions?  Disentangling the role of embodied and disembodied 
technological change, such as in the work by Fisher-Vanden et al. (2006) is also important.  To 39 
 
what extent will improvements in developing countries come from imports of advanced 
technology, as opposed to innovations made in developing countries?  At what speed do these 
international technology transfers occur?  Answers to questions such as these would be very 
useful for economists wishing to model the role of technological change for sustainable 
development.  
 
5. Technological Change in Aggregate Energy-Environment Models 
As noted in the introduction, the potential environmental impacts of technological change 
play an important role in the long-term sustainability of economic growth.  This is particularly 
true in the realm of climate policy, for which most impacts will not be felt for years to come, and 
for which current technologies are not sufficient to meet many of the emissions targets advocated 
at politically acceptable cost.  To assess the role of technological change on long-term 
environmental and economic well-being, economists have developed aggregate economic 
models that integrate economic growth, technological change, and environmental impacts.   
These models demonstrate both the potential for new technologies to limit the environmental 
impact of economic growth, and the challenges of accurately forecasting long-term technological 
trends. 
Indeed, one of the most difficult questions remaining in aggregate energy-economic 
modeling is the appropriate treatment of technological change—particularly for analyzing long-
term environmental and resource problems.  The approach to modeling technological change is 
widely considered to be one of the most important determinants of the results of climate policy 
analyses; that is, the level of emissions abatement that can be achieved at a given cost.  However, 
the detailed microeconomic analyses of the previous two sections suggest complex mechanisms 
by which these processes work.  These mechanisms are not captured easily in modeling 
frameworks, creating significant difficulties for modelers attempting to determine the effects of 
policies that inevitably are intertwined with technological change in energy supply and demand 
technologies. Gillingham, Newell, and Pizer (2008)—from which this section draws 
considerably—provides an in-depth review of this issue.
15  Our focus here is on the techniques 
used to include technological change in these models, as well as the implications of these 
modeling choices.   
The most widespread method of treating technological change in environmental policy 
modeling is to consider it an exogenous variable—simply an autonomous function of time. The 
fundamental distinction between exogenous technological change and endogenous technological 
change is that with exogenous technological change production possibilities depend only on 
time, whereas with endogenous technological change, these possibilities can depend in a variety 
of ways on past, present, and/or future expected prices and policy. Thus, with endogenous 
technological change current technological possibilities for producing output with various 
combinations of capital, labor, and emission limits depend on past activities. In turn, there is a 
dependence of future technological possibilities on current actions.  
                                                 
15 For surveys of the literature and other overviews of modeling methodology, see the references given in 
Gillingham, Newell, and Pizer (2008), including Loschel (2002); Clarke and Weyant (2002); Grubb, Köhler, and 
Anderson (2002); Goulder (2004); Smulders (2005); Vollebergh and Kemfert (2005); Edenhofer et al. (2006); 
Köhler et al. (2006); Sue Wing (2006); Edmonds et al. (2000). 40 
 
Given the large number of other reviews of the endogenous modeling literature, as 
applied to climate modeling, we focus on select papers that illustrate key concepts and provide 
insight into the theoretical basis for this modeling methodology. With only a few exceptions 
most studies find that the ramifications and insights elucidated by incorporating endogenous 
technological change are important quantitatively.  
 
5.1 Exogenous Technological Change 
There are several different ways that climate policy modelers have incorporated 
technological change even when it is only a function of time. The simplest approach to 
technological change is to assume that a Hicks-neutral productivity gain governs the overall 
progress of the economy. However, this approach does not capture the potential for technological 
change to proceed in an energy (and carbon)-saving (or energy-using) manner. An easy 
modification that reflects an energy-saving direction to productivity improvements—within 
either the economy as a whole, or an individual sector—is to include a so-called autonomous 
energy-efficiency improvement (AEEI) parameter, which increases the energy-efficiency of the 
economy by some exogenous amount each year. The use of an AEEI parameter is particularly 
common in more aggregated models (e.g., McCracken et al. (1999), Nordhaus (1994)).  
In more disaggregated models, overall energy-saving progress can also be implemented 
by Hicks-neutral productivity gains in a more energy-efficient sector or technology, or by adding 
a new energy-efficient technology to the menu of available technologies at a given point in time. 
Autonomous energy-efficiency improvement has the primary advantage of simplicity and 
transparency, and in addition reduces the risk of model nonlinearities, multiple equilibria, and 
permits ready sensitivity analysis with different AEEI values. 
In a similar vein, the incorporation of “backstop technologies” into models can also be 
thought of as a form of exogenous technological change. Backstop technologies are typically 
carbon-free energy sources that may be already known, but are not yet commercialized widely. It 
often is assumed that such a backstop technology is available in a virtually unlimited supply at a 
constant, but relatively high, marginal cost (e.g., advanced solar power, nuclear fusion). If the 
price of energy inclusive of carbon policy becomes high enough, the backstop technology will 
penetrate the market and prevent the price of energy from rising further. Modelers often assume 
that the cost of the backstop technology is decreasing with time at its own autonomous rate—
effectively implying that if the backstop comes into effect, then technology is improving solely 
as a function of time.  
Finally, in some econometric models with flexible functional forms there may be 
multiple trends determining the overall level and direction of technological change. For example, 
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) include five parameters describing technological change—two 
describing the overall level and three describing the direction (i.e., the vector of factor biases). 
 
5.2 Endogenous Technological Change 
While modeling technological change exogenously simplifies the modeling of 
technological change, there is a wide literature acknowledging that technological change is a 41 
 
complex process that is dependent on more than just the passage of time. This implies, among 
other things, that the cost function depends not just on time and current prices, but also on 
historic indicators of prices and activity. This view has motivated considerable modeling work 
on the processes by which historic prices (and policies) influence today’s production 
possibilities.
16  In particular, some of these studies criticize the use of AEEI as neglecting the 
causes that affect the evolution of technologies, leading to distorted and inappropriate model 
results.
17  Table 6 presents some of the key papers in this rapidly growing literature. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
One approach is to summarize the influence of historic prices and activity in terms of an 
unobserved “knowledge stock” that governs overall level and direction (i.e., input-bias) of 
technological change. The difficulty lies in determining exactly how this stock accumulates and 
affects future energy use and emissions. As the empirical evidence in section 3 suggests, prices, 
R&D, and learning through past experience all play some role in the accumulation of this stock, 
yet there is no single structural theory that addresses exactly how this occurs, and hence, how 
each influences future production possibilities. 
An important element of incorporating endogenous technological change is whether one 
assumes the “base case” behavior of technological change—in the absence of climate policy—is 
roughly optimal.  One line of reasoning is that exogenous technological change represents a 
constraint that, when relaxed, yields lower costs for reducing emissions. A number of studies 
find this result when endogenous technological change is coupled with the possibility that 
technological change is undersupplied due to innovation market imperfections (Grubb, et al., 
2002). In contrast, other studies implicitly or explicitly assume that technological change in the 
base case is (roughly) optimal; therefore, allowing it to change in response to policy changes 
may not affect mitigation costs very much (e.g., Nordhaus 2002; Goulder and Schneider 1999, 
Goulder and Mathai 2000, Sue Wing 2003, and Smulders and de Nooij 2003). These implicit 
assumptions about the optimality of technological change in the base case often confound 
comparisons of the implications of different approaches for endogenizing technological change. 
Another factor that can influence results across models is whether other technological change 
parameters are adjusted once endogenous technological change is added, in order to allow for 
even-handed comparisons (Gerlagh 2007, Fischer and Newell 2008). 
Although difficult to categorize neatly, the most commonly used approaches model 
endogenous technological change in one of three ways: direct price-induced, R&D-induced, and 
learning-induced. Direct price-induced technological change implies that changes in relative 
prices can spur innovation to reduce the use of the more expensive input (e.g., energy) in 
accordance with the Hicks-induced innovation hypothesis. R&D-induced technological change 
allows for R&D investment to influence the rate and direction of technological change. It often 
involves an explicit knowledge capital stock. Finally, learning-induced technological change 
allows for the unit cost of a particular technology to be a decreasing function of the experience 
                                                 
16 This extensive literature of endogenous technological change includes an edited book (Grübler, et al., 2002), and 
four special journal issues (Resource and Energy Economics, 2003, vol, 25; Energy Economics, 2004, vol. 26; 
Ecological Economics, 2005, vol. 54; and The Energy Journal, Special Issue 2006) 
17 This is related to the Lucas (1976) critique in that AEEI is not a “deep” structural parameter and it is unlikely to 
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with that technology. Learning-by-doing (LBD) is the most commonly employed method used in 
this approach, where the unit cost of a technology is typically modeled as a decreasing function 
of its cumulative output (see section 5.2.3).  
 
5.2.1 Direct Price-Induced Technological Change 
Direct price-induced technological change is a relatively straightforward method of 
endogenizing technological change with conceptual roots dating back to Hicks (1932). In the 
context of climate policy modeling, if the price of energy rises, price-induced technological 
change will lead to greater energy efficiency, often through a productivity parameter that is tied 
to historic prices (or whose change is tied to current prices) or through earlier diffusion of 
energy-efficient technologies. The exact pathway through which this occurs depends greatly on 
the model structure. There are only a few examples of direct price-induced technological change 
used in climate policy models due to the somewhat ad hoc, reduced-form nature of specifying the 
relationship between price and technological change. In particular, there is no accounting for the 
cost of achieving these changes, which may involve R&D investments (see next section).  It is 
most common for models that use price-induced technological change to use an AEEI parameter 
or a LBD approach as well. 
Perhaps the most faithful representation of price-induced technological change is 
Jakeman et al. (2004), who assume a fixed amount of technological change in each region and 
time period, which is allocated across inputs to all industries according to the relative prices of 
the inputs. In this case, including price-induced technological change reduces the cost of meeting 
carbon mitigation targets. Other examples in energy-economic modeling include (Dowlatabadi 
1998) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s NEMS model (EIA 2003). The 
empirical evidence presented in section 3.1 suggests that the price-inducement form of 
technological change has merit as a partial explanation; higher energy prices clearly are 
associated with faster improvements in energy efficiency.  However, the reduced-form approach 
largely has been passed over for the R&D- or learning-induced technological change 
methodologies.  
 
5.2.2 R&D-induced technological change 
R&D-induced technological change is one of the most common approaches used to 
endogenize technological change, and a variety of models have been developed along these lines. 
R&D-based technological change has a long-running theoretical foundation beginning with the 
early work by Kennedy (1964), Kamien and Schwartz (1968), and Binswanger and Ruttan 
(1978) in developing the innovation possibility frontier (IPF) and the theory behind induced 
technological change. More recent work by Acemoglu (2002) addresses how the tradeoff 
between innovation in different directions inherent in the IPF results endogenously from a firm’s 
dynamic optimization. This approach parallels the endogenous-growth literature (e.g., Lucas 
(1988), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Acemoglu 
(1998), Kily (1999), and Kortum and Eaton (2008)) in including a stock of “knowledge capital” 
when modeling economic growth. Recently, the concept of induced innovation has enjoyed a 
renaissance in economics through Acemoglu’s work on directed technological change.  43 
 
Climate policy modelers have introduced a knowledge stock in a variety of different 
ways. While the theoretical basis for relative prices inducing technological change in a particular 
direction is quite well-developed, exactly how the knowledge stock accumulates and influences 
production possibilities is not completely settled in the literature. In some models, the concept of 
the knowledge stock is made more concrete by using an IPF to govern how investments in R&D 
increase the knowledge stock. Popp (2004) develops one such model and discusses the use of 
empirical evidence to parameterize the IPF. Model structures vary in terms of whether they 
permit embedding the IPF within a perpetual inventory framework for the knowledge stock, 
analogous to inventory methods for standard capital stocks. 
Several themes resonate throughout the R&D model literature. Two key points are 
whether R&D-induced technological change is associated with an innovation market 
imperfection due to spillovers, and whether carbon-saving R&D crowds out R&D in other 
sectors. There clearly exists a tension between spillovers and crowding out, with the former 
tending to point to greater cost savings when endogenous technological change is included and 
the latter dampening or even overturning that effect. In many models, the degree to which 
spillovers and crowding out arise is a complex interaction among underlying assumptions about 
model structure and distortions in the R&D market. Yet, these assumptions have important 
ramifications for the total cost of a climate policy as well as the conclusions drawn about the 
degree to which estimates based on exogenous technology assumptions are biased. There is only 
a small empirical and conceptual literature to guide assumptions of the degree of crowding out, 
primarily on the elasticity of the science and engineering workforce in relation to greater R&D 
incentives (Goolsbee 1998, David and Hall 2000, Wolff and Reinthaler 2008). 
A third point is whether there is a substitutability, as in most papers, or complementarity 
between the generation of output (i.e., conventional production) and the generation of new 
knowledge (i.e., innovation). Most approaches have some mechanism where the generation of 
output substitutes for the generation of knowledge, implying a larger role for crowding out and 
less opportunity for gains from endogenous technological change. Related to this issue is the 
important difference among models in the elasticity of the supply, or opportunity cost, of 
additional R&D. If there is a relatively inelastic supply of R&D (e.g., capable engineers and 
scientists), more effort on climate mitigation R&D reduces the ability of other firms or sectors to 
perform R&D, effectively crowding out R&D activity. This implies that the cost of a carbon 
constraint could be more or less costly with the inclusion of endogenous technological change 
(versus presumptively leading to lower costs). 
 
5.2.2.1 Theoretical Models of R&D-Induced Technological Change  
Including a knowledge stock in the production function does not on its own imply a 
pathway for inducing carbon-saving technological change. In the simple formulation of a 
knowledge stock that is most true to the endogenous growth literature, the knowledge stock 
increases the productivity of all inputs equally. For example, Buonanno et al. (2003) extend the 
Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model to implement such a knowledge stock in the 
endogenous technological change-RICE numerical model. This simple methodology for 
endogenizing technological change may be useful to capture important aggregate dynamics, but 
it does not provide a pathway for relative prices to influence energy-saving or carbon-saving 44 
 
innovation.  
Smulders and de Nooij (2003) and van Zon and Yetkiner (2003) both build on the 
endogenous growth literature that includes a continuum of intermediate goods (e.g., Romer 
(1990)) and apply a variation of this modeling approach to an economy that includes energy as 
an input to production. In Smulders and de Nooij, endogenous technological change is achieved 
by improvements in the quality of the continuum of intermediate goods through investment in 
R&D, while van Zon and Yetkiner achieve endogenous technological change through increases 
in the variety of the continuum of intermediate goods through R&D investment. Both papers 
demonstrate the important theoretical point that profit maximization by innovating intermediate 
goods producers can give rise to a change in the direction of technological change toward 
energy-saving technological change based on increasing energy prices or constrained energy 
quantities. 
Smulders and de Nooij’s modeling framework allows for policy analysis examining the 
short- and long-run growth implications of energy conservation policies but does not address 
questions of economic welfare. They find that energy-conservation policy will lead to reduced 
net per capita income levels due to the direct costs of the policy outweighing the offsetting effect 
of induced innovation. Nonetheless, the endogenous technological change framework does 
reduce the cost of a policy, although non-energy R&D activities may be crowded out, with no 
increase in total R&D. In fact, a theoretical result based on this model structure is that the gains 
from induced innovation will never offset the initial policy-induced decline in per capita income 
levels, obviating the possibility of “win-win” situations. As a general proposition, endogenous 
technological change should induce higher long-run output only if spillovers are relatively high 
in carbon-saving innovation compared to other areas that would otherwise receive R&D effort. 
This appears not to be the case in Smulders and de Nooij’s model. The same messages arise in 
Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Gerlagh (2008). 
In contrast, van Zon and Yetkiner use a blueprint framework to find that an energy tax 
that is recycled in the form of an R&D subsidy may increase long-run growth, through R&D-
induced technological change. This result stems from two different market imperfections in the 
R&D market: (1) firms do not consider the effect that current R&D has on increasing the 
productivity of future R&D investment because it is not captured appropriately in the price of the 
blueprints and (2) a market imperfection in the supply of intermediates that leads to too low of a 
demand for those intermediates relative to the social optimum. Effectively, these market 
imperfections imply an intertemporal spillover for each firm, rather than a spillover from the 
research of one firm to other firms. Crowding out also plays a less prominent role in the van Zon 
and Yetkiner model than in Smulders and de Nooij. 
Sue Wing (2006) further develops this theory in the context of climate change policy by  
adding externalities and environmental taxation to Acemoglu’s (2002) model. Sue Wing shows 
that an environmental tax always biases production away from the dirty good towards the clean 
good.  However, this does not necessarily mean that the environmental tax also biases innovation 
towards research on the clean good.  Rather, this depends on the substitutability between clean 
and dirty inputs.  If the clean input is not readily substitutable for the more expensive dirty input, 
the absolute quantity of dirty R&D exhibits a hump-shaped profile, so that it increases under 
small environmental taxes, but declines under higher environmental taxes.  That is, a low 45 
 
environmental tax encourages research to make the dirty input more productive, so as to get 
more output from each unit of the dirty input.  
 
5.2.2.2 Numerical Models of R&D-Induced Technological Change 
Unfortunately, theoretical models with continuous intermediate goods and abstract 
representations of blueprints are not well-suited to match technological change up to measurable 
real-world variables or technologies that most numerical models attempt to represent.  However, 
the more general notion of including a Hicks-neutral knowledge stock, as shown above in 
Buonanno et al. (2003) or factor-augmenting knowledge stock, as in Smulders and de Nooij 
(2003), is a common choice for numerical models that include an economy-wide production 
function. Popp (2004) provides a good example of this approach in an economy-wide production 
function. Gerlagh and Lise (2005), Hart (2008), and Gerlagh (2008) also employ simple 
calibrated R&D models within an assessment of climate policy-induced innovation. 
In the DICE model (Nordhaus 1994), one of the best known models of climate policy, 
carbon intensity (i.e., carbon per unit of GDP) is affected by the substitution of capital and labor 
for carbon energy. This is modified in the R&DICE model in Nordhaus (2002), so that carbon 
intensity is determined by an IPF, which is a function of R&D inputs into the carbon-energy 
sector. The cost of investing in knowledge through R&D is subtracted from consumption in the 
DICE model’s output balance equation, analogous to conventional investment. In the case of 
R&D investment, however, the cost of research is multiplied by four to reflect a generic 
innovation market imperfection; that is, that the social opportunity cost of R&D exceeds its 
private cost due to crowding out.   
Nordhaus (2002) compares this endogenous technological change specification with the 
specification in DICE (where carbon intensity only is affected by mitigation efforts substituting 
abatement for consumption). His primary conclusion is that induced innovation is likely to be 
less powerful of a factor in reducing emissions than substitution. This result is related directly to 
the calibration that assumes the returns to R&D equal the opportunity costs, allowing crowding 
out to have an important effect. Buonanno et al. (2003) provide a different variation on 
Nordhaus’ approach by making emission intensity a function of a knowledge stock that 
accumulates one-to-one with R&D investment and depreciates at an exogenous rate; however, 
there is no potential for climate-friendly R&D to compete with or crowd out other R&D.  As 
such, they find a much larger role for induced innovation.  Using the ENTICE model, Popp 
(2004) investigates the importance of R&D crowding out more carefully.  The base case of 
ENTICE assumes that one-half of new energy R&D crowds out other R&D.  In this case, 
induced innovation increases welfare by 9%.  Assuming no crowding out increases the welfare 
gains from induced innovation to as much as 45%.  Similarly, assuming full crowding of R&D 
reduces welfare gains to as little as 2%.  Finally, Gerlagh (2008) extends this work by separately 
modeling the choice of carbon-energy producing R&D, carbon-energy saving R&D, and neutral 
R&D.  In such a case, it is carbon-producing R&D, rather than neutral R&D, that is crowded out 
by induced carbon-energy saving R&D.  As a result, the impact of induced technological change 
is larger, with optimal carbon taxes falling by a factor of 2.  
Multi-sector general equilibrium models differ from the previous approaches in that the 
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sectors is modeled.
18 The strength of the approach is that it may provide additional insights on 
the effects of interactions between sectors, such as spillovers—or crowding out—from R&D. 
The cost is that general equilibrium models tend to be data intensive and computationally 
demanding. Just as in several of the models discussed above, some general equilibrium models 
explicitly endogenize technological change through the inclusion of knowledge capital in the 
production function, albeit at a sectoral level, rather than economy-wide.  
One notable example is Goulder and Schneider (1999). Goulder and Schneider develop a 
partial equilibrium analytical framework and then implement some of the resulting insights in a 
numerical general equilibrium model that endogenizes technological change, with a particular 
emphasis on spillover effects. Specifically, in their general equilibrium model, Goulder and 
Schneider divide the knowledge stock into appropriable knowledge and non-excludable 
knowledge. The non-excludable knowledge represents the spillover knowledge enjoyed by all 
firms in each industry (but not across industries). A scaling factor is then used to determine the 
effect of spillovers on output in a CES production function for a representative firm in each 
industry. R&D thus influences output both through the firm’s input of appropriable knowledge 
and the spillovers from non-excludable knowledge generated in the industry. Goulder and 
Schneider find that the presence of endogenous technological change in their model leads to 
lower costs of achieving a given abatement target, but higher gross costs of a given carbon tax 
(i.e., costs before netting out climate benefits). In fact, both costs and benefits of a given carbon 
tax are higher relative to their model with only exogenous technological change, due to more 
extensive carbon abatement, for the economy responds more elastically to price shocks from the 
policy. With environmental benefits included, Goulder and Schneider find greater net benefits of 
this higher abatement level for a given carbon tax when endogenous technological change is 
present. This outcome can be reinforced or muted if there are prior distortions in R&D markets, 
depending on the type of distortions. 
One important feature underlying these results is a crowding out effect where expansion 
of knowledge generation in one sector comes at a cost to other sectors due to the limited pool of 
knowledge-generating resources (i.e., there is a positive and increasing opportunity cost to R&D 
in one sector). A carbon-tax policy serves to spur R&D in the alternative energy sector, but 
discourages R&D in non-energy and conventional energy sectors due both to slower growth of 
output in those industries and the limited pool of knowledge-generating resources. On the other 
hand, the knowledge spillover effects, whereby policy-induced R&D has social returns above 
private returns, provide additional benefits from a climate policy above the environmental 
benefits. However, the presence of endogenous technological change with spillovers does not 
imply the possibility of zero-cost carbon abatement, unless the spillovers overwhelm the 
crowding out effect, a largely empirical question. 
Sue Wing (2003) incorporates endogenous technological change into a detailed general 
equilibrium model, building on several of the concepts in Goulder and Schneider (1999) and 
others. At the core of Sue Wing’s model is a recursive, dynamic general equilibrium model in 
which a representative agent maximizes welfare. A major difference between Sue Wing’s model 
and previous models is that Sue Wing further distinguishes several of the factors influencing 
innovation to gain insight into the general equilibrium effects of inducing innovation in one 
                                                 
18 Others have taken a macroeconometric approaches (e.g., Carraro and Galeotti 1997). 47 
 
sector and its consequences for the cost of carbon policies. Conceptually, Sue Wing describes his 
approach in terms of two commodities: a “clean” commodity and a “dirty” commodity. Sue 
Wing (2003) finds that a carbon tax reduces aggregate R&D, slowing the rate of technological 
change and the growth in output. Given the fixed-saving rule and absence of knowledge 
spillovers in the model, this follows from having a smaller economy due to the carbon tax. 
However, the relative price effects of a carbon tax lead to considerable reallocation of knowledge 
services, enabling the economy to adjust to the carbon tax in a more elastic manner, reducing the 
total costs of the carbon tax.  
 
5.2.3 Learning-Induced Technological Change 
Learning-induced technological change approaches tend to be quite different than R&D-
induced approaches. These models use the concept of learning-by-doing (LBD) described in 
section 3.2.2, in which costs to manufacturers decrease as a function of cumulative output, or 
“learning-by-using,” in which the decrease in costs (and/or increase in benefits) to consumers 
comes as a function of the use of a technology (Arrow, 1962, Rosenberg, 1982). The primary 
disadvantage to the incorporation of learning-induced technological change into aggregate 
economic modeling is its reduced-form nature. LBD can be inserted mechanically into many 
models, but it is difficult to identify the mechanisms behind LBD—or even be confident about 
the causality. The ease with which learning curves can be estimated may give a false sense of 
comfort and precision that may belie the R&D or other resources that went into the technology 
development (Clarke and Weyant, 2002). For instance, it may be that the part of the underlying 
force driving learning curves is R&D, which tends to be roughly proportional to sales. In fact, 
some have used learning curve estimates to calibrate an R&D-based model (Gerlagh and Lise 
2005). 
  Despite its disadvantages, the tractability of learning curves has led to the use of 
learning-induced technological change throughout the literature, particularly in disaggregated or 
so-called “bottom-up” models. Disaggregated models are well-suited for incorporating learning 
because of their rich technology specificity, which easily lends itself to a learning curve for each 
technology. Some more aggregated models also use learning, but it is not as common.  
A common result of including endogenous technological change through LBD is that the 
carbon tax needed to attain a specific CO2 concentration target tends to be lower than in models 
without LBD. This result is intuitive—with LBD modeled as described above, no R&D 
expenditure is needed and any additional capacity of carbon-free energy technologies will lower 
the costs of that technology in the future, leading to more emissions reductions per dollar of 
further investment. Another commonly observed result of incorporating LBD in climate policy 
models is that the optimal abatement path to reach a given concentration target involves 
increased near-term abatement and less abatement later (Grübler and Messner, 1998). This result 
occurs because increased near-term abatement encourages earlier LBD in low-carbon 
technologies, which lowers the long-term costs of abatement.  Van der Zwaan et al. (2002) also 
find a strong effect of LBD on the timing of abatement, showing that earlier abatement is 
desirable when LBD is included in climate models, and that the carbon taxes needed to achieve 
these reductions are lower, due to the cost savings resulting from LBD. 
Other studies suggest that there are actually two competing effects. On one hand, there is 48 
 
the added value to near-term technology investment due to LBD, as just mentioned. On the other 
hand, LBD also leads to lower costs of future abatement, which implies that abatement should be 
delayed. The net result of the two opposing effects may be theoretically ambiguous, but 
numerical simulations by Manne and Richels (2004) suggest that the slope of the abatement 
curve over time actually may be steeper with LBD included, contrary to previous findings, such 
as those of Grübler and Messner (1998) described above.  
Goulder and Mathai (2000) look at optimal carbon abatement policy in a dynamic setting, 
considering not only the optimal overall amount of abatement but also its timing.  They consider 
separately cases in which innovation comes through R&D and in which innovation comes via 
learning-by-doing.  In the R&D model, there are two effects of induced innovation on optimal 
abatement:  it reduces marginal abatement costs, which increases the optimal amount of 
abatement.  But it also increases the cost of abatement today relative to the future, because of 
lower abatement costs in the future.  The combination of these effects implies that with R&D-
induced innovation, optimal abatement is lower in early years and higher in later years than it 
would otherwise be.  In contrast, in the learning-by-doing model, there is a third effect:   
abatement today lowers the cost of abatement in the future.  This reinforces the tendency for 
cumulative optimal abatement to be higher in the presence of induced innovation, but makes the 
effect on optimal near-term abatement ambiguous.  Bramoullé and Olson (2005) formalize the 
relationship between learning and policy, noting that if technology improves by learning by 
doing, abatement across time should be allocated so that marginal abatement costs are equal 
across time, with an adjustment for the cumulative marginal savings that current abatement 
provides for future costs.  
 
5.3 What Can Technological Change Economists Contribute?  
Given the considerable variety of approaches used to include endogenous technological 
change in economic models for analyzing climate policy, it is clear that there is no agreement in 
the literature regarding a single best approach. All of the approaches have their limitations and 
all are approximations that miss some important phenomena underlying the complex nature of 
technological change, with important effects on the results of climate policy models. Perhaps 
more importantly, all struggle with an inherent lack of empirical data to calibrate model 
parameters convincingly. Thus, while exceptionally promising, there is a sense that our ability to 
conceptually model technological change has outstripped our ability to validate the models 
empirically, making this an area for high-value research and where policymakers and other 
normative users need to be particularly careful.  
Looking forward, there are several promising areas for continued research on the 
modeling of induced technological change in energy-economic models.  Most models simulate 
policy through a simple emissions constraint or by using carbon taxes to impose a price on 
emissions.  In contrast, real-world climate policy often makes use of a variety of smaller policies, 
such as subsidies for technology adoption, R&D funding and tax incentives, information 
programs, renewable portfolio standards, and energy efficiency standards. Improving the ability 
of assessment models to assess the effects of both price and non-price technology policies would 
be a valuable contribution. This may require relaxing assumptions that the only relevant market 
failure is that related to the climate externality.  The current generation of models addresses 
diffusion only to the extent that improperly priced pollution makes adoption of clean 49 
 
technologies less likely.  However, as discussed in section 4.1.2.2, empirical evidence suggests 
that diffusion is slow for other reasons.  In this regard, greater attention to knowledge spillovers, 
adjustment costs, and informational market failures may be necessary.  For instance, Schwoon 
and Tol (2006) use adjustment costs to develop a climate model with slower penetration of new 
technology. Given the lack of consensus as to why energy-efficient technologies are 
underutilized, it isn’t clear that one “correct” representation of gradual diffusion exists.   
Developing alternative means for modeling the gradual diffusion process, such as incorporating 
higher discount rates for potential adopters, could enable a comparison of diffusion mandates 
across a range of assumptions about why diffusion is gradual.  
Another potential role for technological change economists is critical assessment, 
synthesis, and extension of the existing empirical literature on learning curves in energy 
technologies.  This includes improving the ability of assessment models to incorporate learning 
effects in an economically coherent manner, as well as new empirical research avoiding the 
pitfalls of previous studies and that can potentially be incorporated into computational models.  
Assessment models would also benefit from improved treatment of technology spillovers and the 
opportunity cost of R&D directed toward carbon mitigation technology.  Finally, given the long-
term nature of the climate problem, empirical, analytical and numerical research on the treatment 




Technological change plays an important role in environmental policy.  While new 
technologies can make cleaner production and more efficient resource use possible, markets are 
unlikely to provide proper incentives for the development of clean technologies, absent public 
policy.  As in other areas of technological change, knowledge spillovers lead to underinvestment 
in R&D by private firms.  However, even if all knowledge market failures were addressed, firms 
would still underinvest in environmental R&D, as many of the benefits to providing a cleaner 
environmental are external.  By addressing the externality problem, environmental policy 
increases incentives for environmental R&D.  
Much of the research described in this chapter addresses the links between environmental 
policy and innovation.  While any environmental policy should provide some additional 
incentive for environmentally-oriented R&D, environmental economists have focused much 
research on how the proper design of policy will lead to greater innovation.  In particular, 
flexible policy instruments that provide rewards for continual environmental improvement and 
cost reduction tend to have better dynamic efficiency properties than policies that specify a 
specific behavior.   
Measuring the effects of environmental technological change is equally if not more 
challenging.  There are three main challenges here.  Because policy is needed to encourage 
adoption of environmental technology, one needs to separately identify the effects of both 
environmental policy and innovation to ascertain the gains from environmental technological 
change.  Moreover, while innovation on alternative energy sources has increased in recent years, 
diffusion is still slow, as these technologies still are not cost competitive with fossil fuels without 50 
 
policy intervention. As a result, while there are good data on the cost of traditional energy 
sources, due to thorough market penetration, quality data on the cost savings accruing from early 
research on alternative energy sources is lacking, as such technologies have yet to become well-
established in the market place.  The data that do exist are often aggregate in nature, making 
identifying the various effects of R&D, experience, and policy difficult, as in our discussion of 
learning curves in section 3.2.2. 
A third challenge for estimating the effects of environmental technological change is the 
role of government R&D, particularly with respect to environmentally-friendly energy R&D.  
Government R&D is particularly important for energy, where many technologies are still years 
from being commercially viable.  The combination of long-term payoffs and high uncertainty 
make government R&D a popular policy choice.  However, there is little research evaluating the 
effectiveness of these programs, making this a fruitful topic for technological change scholars 
interested in doing research on environmental topics. 
As with environmental innovation, studies on the diffusion of environmental technologies 
also find that regulation is necessary for diffusion to occur.  One notable difference is between 
environmental technologies (e.g. pollution control) and energy efficiency technologies.  Without 
environmental regulation, there is little private benefit to pollution control.  Thus, as expected, 
regulation is necessary for diffusion to occur.  Individual consumers or firms can benefit from 
choosing energy efficient technologies, as adopters benefit from lower energy bills.  However, 
research on the adoption of energy efficiency technologies suggests that decision-making by both 
firms and consumers is potentially subject to market and behavioral failures (Gillingham, 
Newell, and Palmer 2009).  Both environment and technological change have, in the last several 
decades, benefitted greatly from an increased attention to the micro over the macro, and to 
empirical measurement over pure theory.  To address questions such as the “energy paradox,” 
one might expand the scope of micro-empirical analysis to include a wider array of factors 
affecting people’s decisions – what could be termed as a Behavioral Economics of 
Environmental Technology Innovation and Diffusion. 
In recent years, environmental economists have begun to investigate the role of 
international technology diffusion for environmental technologies.  International diffusion is 
particularly important for problems such as climate change, as carbon emissions are growing 
faster in developing nations than in the developed world.  Recent research suggests that these 
developing countries can take advantage of clean technologies developed in high income 
countries, but that both environmental and trade policy will affect the pace and quality of 
international technology diffusion.  Compared to the more general literature on international 
technology transfer, applications pertaining to the environment are scarce, and are another area 
where technological change scholars could have a significant impact. 
Aggregate economic models combining economic growth, technological change, and 
environmental policy demonstrate the important long term benefits that can come from 
environmentally-friendly technological change.  Unchecked by environmental policy, increased 
economic growth is likely to come with increased environmental impacts.  While the costs of 
mitigating these impacts could lower future growth, technological change offers the opportunity 
to offset increasing environmental compliance costs.  Still, just as the modeling of technological 
change itself in macroeconomics is still evolving, there is much work to be done on aggregate 
economic representations of environmental technological change. Moreover, both technological 51 
 
change and environmental policy are areas where the usual presumption of efficiency of 
competitive markets is reversed—the presumption is of market failure.  Yet recommendations 
regarding good policy still depend on important empirical magnitudes that are often not well 
measured.     
One key question is estimating baseline technological change.  Even without policy 
changes, some environmentally technologies will develop.  This is particularly important for 
climate change, as energy efficiency has historically improved over time.  Rates of future 
technological change have a large impact on projections of future carbon emissions.  As policy 
evolves to reduce future carbon emissions, baseline projections help determine how stringent 
climate policies must be in order to attain certain environmental goals, and in turn what the 
economic cost of these constraints may be.  Also important here is integrating the 
microeconomic foundations of technological change into macroeconomic representations of 
climate policy.  Many models still overlook basic features of knowledge markets, such as the 
role of knowledge spillovers.  As shown in section 5, the assumptions about technological 
change used in these models can greatly influence projections about future policy costs. 
We conclude by considering challenges that may be unique to environmental 
technological change.  One question is how the dual market failures of environmental 
externalities and knowledge spillovers interact.  Is simply combining environmental policy to 
address externalities with general technology policy to address spillovers sufficient, or do these 
two market failures interact in ways that necessitate specific technology policies for the 
environment?   
Uncertainty may provide one interaction causing first-order policies to be insufficient.  In 
“pure” environment issues, uncertainty is about the behavior of natural systems.  In technological 
change this “natural” uncertainty is exacerbated by uncertainty about the behavior of human and 
social systems.  For example, the huge uncertainties surrounding the future impacts of climate 
change, the magnitude of the policy response, and thus the likely returns to R&D investment, 
would seem to exacerbate the challenge of encouraging private environmental investment.  What 
the future will look like will be determined, to a very significant extent, by the rate and direction 
of technological change between now and then.  But it is also true that what happens today with 
respect to the investments that will determine that rate and direction is highly dependent on 
people’s beliefs about what will happen in the future.  For instance, given the need for 
environmental policy to encourage environmental innovation, policy makers need to both 
provide current incentives and signal the future costs of pollution to inventors.  Are current 
policy instruments and institutions sufficient to address the uncertainties and long time frames 
often observed with environmental problems? This is a major challenge for environmental policy 
makers, perhaps the single greatest challenge.  We hope that research on such questions can 
provide a framework for future work linking policy and environmental technological change. 52 
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Table 1 – Empirical Studies of Environmental Induced Innovation 
 
Article  What is induced?  What causes innovation?  Data  Key results 
Lanjouw and Mody (1996)  Environmentally-friendly 
patents 
Pollution Abatement Costs and 
Expenditures (PACE) 
U.S., Japan, Germany, 14 
other countries industry 
PACE leads increase in 
environmentally-friendly 
innovation. 
Jaffe and Palmer (1997)  Overall R&D spending/patents  PACE  U.S. industry 1974-1991 
PACE affects R&D 
spending, but not patenting 
activity. 
Newell et al. (1999)  Energy efficiency 
technologies 
Regulatory standards 
Energy price changes 
Appliance characteristics and 
energy price 1958-1993 
Energy prices and 
regulatory standards affect 
energy efficiency 
innovation. 
Popp (2002)  Energy and energy efficiency 
technologies 
Price of fossil fuels 
Existing knowledge stock 
U.S. energy patents 1970-
1994 
Both energy prices and the 
existing knowledge stock 
induce R&D. 
Brunnermeier and Cohen 
(2003)  Environmental patents  PACE  U.S. industry  PACE  has small effects on 
patents (0.04%/$1 mil). 
Hamamoto (2006)  Overall R&D spending  PACE  Japanese industry 1966-76  PACE leads to increased 
R&D expenditures.  
Popp (2006b)  SO2 and NOX emission 
reduction patents  Environmental regulations  U.S., Japan, Germany 
patents, 1970-2000 
Environmental regulations 
significantly increase SO2 
and NOx reduction patents. 
Hascic et al. (2008) 
Patents for 5 environmental 
technology: air pollution, 
water pollution, wastes 
disposal, noise protection, and 
environmental monitoring 
PACE and environmental 
stringency 
PACE expenditures 1985-
2004 &World Economic 
Forum survey 
Private PACE leads to 
environmental innovation 
but government PACE does 
not.  However, 
governmental R&D 
promotes increase of 
environmental patents. 67 
 
Table 2 – Key Theoretical Papers on Innovation and Environmental Policy Instruments 
 
Article Policies  Key  results 
Magat (1978)  Effluent taxes, uniform standards  Ranking is ambiguous. 
Magat (1979)  Taxes, subsidies, permits, effluent standards, 
technology standards 
All except technology standards induce innovation.  Taxes, 
permits, and effluent standard have similar effects.  
Carraro and Siniscalco (1994)  Environmental policy instruments, industrial policy 
instruments 
Innovation subsidies have the same effects as environmental 
policy instruments, except for emissions reduction from 
pollution taxes. 
Laffont and Tirole (1996)  Tradable permit system   Futures markets for permits lead to innovation. 
Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagne (1996)  Incentive scheme  Government-issued threats of regulation can be a solution for 
information asymmetry. 
Carraro and Soubeyran (1996)  Emission tax & R&D subsidy  R&D subsidies are desirable if decrease of product output is 
small or considered negative. 
Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996)  Tax & environmental R&D subsidy  Tax and subsidy together can overcome the market failure. 
Ulph (1998)  Pollution taxes, uniform standards 
Stricter standards and taxes do not have significant effect on 
R&D level.  There are two competing effects: policies increase 
costs (and R&D), but also lower output (which decreases R&D). 
Montero (2002)  Various policy instruments under non-competitive 
environments 
Types of market affect the level of R&D incentives from 
standards and taxes. Cournot competition leads to higher 
incentive while Bertrand competition leads to lower incentive. 
Innes and Bial (2002)  Environmental regulation , firm’s behavior  Technology leaders favor stricter environmental regulations, as 
these policies raise the costs of competitors. 
Fischer et al. (2003)  Market-based policies, uniform standards  Ranking is ambiguous, and depends on ability to diffuse 
technologies, cost, and number of polluting firms. 
Requate (2005) 
Ex post regulation, interim regulation, ex ante 
regulation (with different tax rates), ex ante 
regulation (with a single tax rate) 
Ex ante policies with different tax rates dominate, and tax 
policies are always preferred to permit policies. 
Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008)  Alternative energy with no carbon emission, 
conventional energy with efficiency improvement 
With uncertainty, stringency of policy matters.  With weak 
environmental policy, improvements in conventional energy 
efficiency are acceptable. However, strong standards require 
alternative energy (no carbon emissions). 
Bauman, Lee, and Seeley (2008)  Market-based policies, uniform standards 
If command and control policies lead to innovation which 
lowers the marginal abatement cost curve, they may induce 
more innovation than market-based policies. 68 
 
Table 3 – Key Empirical Papers on Innovation and Environmental Policy Instruments 
 
Article Policies  Data  Key  results 
Newell et al. (1999) 
Energy price-based policies, energy 
efficiency standards, labeling 
Appliance model characteristics and 
energy prices 1958-1993 
Energy price changes lead to the 
introduction of new technologies in the 
market and removal of old models, while 
regulation works only by eliminating old 
models. 
Popp (2003)  SO2 permits , direct regulation  U.S. coal-fired power plants 1985-97 
CAC innovation led to cost savings.  
Innovation with permit trading led to both 
cost savings and emissions reductions. 
Lange and Bellas (2005)  Clean Air Act 
U.S. coal-fired power plants 1985-
2002 
Permit trading system lead to lower capital 
and operating costs. Mandatory regulation 
alone does not promote change in costs. 
Lanoie et al. (2007) 
Environmental policy instruments, 
environmental R&D  Survey of firms in 7 OECD countries 
For inducing environmental R&D, 
stringency of policies is more important 
than policy type.   
Johnstone et al. (2008) 
Environmental policy instruments, 
environmental R&D 
EPO pollution control patents to 
OECD countries, 1978-2004 
Flexible policies lead to higher quality 
innovations (measured by patent family 
size). 
Taylor (2008)  SO2 permits, direct regulation  U.S. patents 1975-2004 
Uncertainty over future permit prices 
reduces innovation incentives for 3
rd party 
producers. 
Johnston et al. (2008) 
Price-based policies, quantity-based 
policies 
EPO renewable energy technology 
patents from 25 OECD countries, 
1978-2003 
Price-based policies lead to solar and waste-
to-energy technologies, while quantity-
based policies lead to wind energy (closest 
to current energy market). 
 69 
 
Table 4 – Factors Affecting Adoption of Environmental Technology 
Article Technology Data  Key  results 
Kerr and Newell (2003)  Lead-reducing refining technology  U.S. oil refineries, 1971-1995 
Increased stringency increases adoption.  
Larger and more sophisticated refineries 
adopted first. 
Keohane (2007)  SO2 scrubbers  U.S. coal-fired power plants, 1995-
1999 
Adoption decision was more sensitive to 
cost differences under tradable permits. 
Kemp (1998)  Water pollution treatment facilities   Dutch food and beverage plants 
1974–91  Effluent charges increase adoption 
Purvis and Outlaw (1995)  Water pollution control technologies 
for U.S. livestock production  N/A 
Regulations led to adoption of “time-tested” 
rather than innovative technologies, 
because EPA was more likely to approve 
permits for these. 
Snyder et al, (2003)  Membrane-cell technology for 
chlorine production 
U.S. Chlorine Manfacturers, 1976-
2001 
Regulation not only encourages adoption, 
but also leads to the shutdown of plants 
using older technologies. 
Popp (2006d) 
Combustion modification and post 
combustion controls for NOX 
emissions from coal-fired power 
plants 
U.S. coal-fired power plants, 1990-
2003 
Regulation is the dominant factor.  
Technology improvements lead to more 
adoption for combustion modification, but 
not for more expensive post-combustion 
controls, which are only adopted when 
needed because of regulatory pressures. 
Frondel et al. (2007)  End-of-pipe vs. process abatement  Survey of OECD firms 
Regulations are more likely to lead to end-
of-pipe solutions. Market forces influence 
cleaner production processes. 
Wolfram and Bushnell (2008)  Modifications at coal-fired electric 
power plants  U.S. power plants, 1998-2004  Effect of New Source Review on capital 
investment is small 
Fowlie (2007)  NOX pollution control techniques 
702 U.S. coal-fired power plants 
covered by the NOX Budget Program, 
2000-2004 
Plants in restructured markets are less likely 
to install costly abatement equipment. 
Blackman and Bannister (1998)  Cleaner fuels  Traditional brick kilns in Mexico  Community pressure and local non-
governmental organizations are important 
Popp et al (2008)  Low-chlorine production of pulp and 
paper 
Pulp plants in the U.S., Canada, 
Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Japan, 
1990-2005 
Consumer pressure spurred adoption 70 
 
Table 5 – Barriers to Adoption of Environmentally-Friendly Technologies 
Article Technology  Barrier(s) to adoption  Data  Key results 
Jaffe and Stavins (1995)  Thermal insulation Up-front  costs  matter  more  US residential construction 
1979-88 
Lower adoption costs 3x 
more likely to encourage 
adoption than increased 
energy costs 
Hassett and Metcalf (1995)  Residential energy 
conservation  Up-front costs matter more  US households 1979-1981 
Installation cost savings via 
tax credits encourage 
adoption 
Kemp (1997)  Thermal home insulation  Inadequate information  Netherlands households 
Government subsidies do 
not lead to adoption.  
Epidemic model fits data 
better than rational choice 
model. 
Metcalfe and Hassett (1999)  Attic insulation  Inadequate information 
U.S. Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey, 1984, 
1987, & 1990 
Actual energy savings are 
less than promised 
Reppelin-Hill (1999)  Clean steal technologies  Import barriers 
Adoption of electric arc 
furnace in 30 countries, 
1970-1994 
Import barriers restrain the 
adoption from foreign-
produced goods 
Howarth et al. (2000)  Energy-saving technology 
(efficient lighting equipment) 
Agency decision making 
problems 
Inadequate information 
Green Lights and Energy 
Star programs 
Voluntary programs lead to 




Nijkamp et al. (2001)  Energy-efficient technology 
Economic barriers 
-  alternative investment 
-  low energy costs 
-  capital replacement 
Survey of Dutch firms 
Economic barriers affect 
adoption more than 
financial and uncertainty 
barriers 
Mulder et al. (2003)  Energy efficiency 
technologies 
Complementarities among 




Anderson and Newell (2004) 
Firm-level adoption of energy-
saving projects recommended 
by energy audits 
Inadequate information on 
technologies 
Initial costs and payback years 
of adoption 
U.S. Department of Energy’s 
Industrial Assessment 
Centers database, 1981-2000 
Firms adopt additional 
projects with improved 
information.  Up-front costs 
have 40% greater effect 
than energy costs. 71 
 







Jakeman et al. (2004)  CGE  PI  PI technological change lead to decrease in abatement costs. 
Popp (2004)  IAM  R&D 
Induced innovation increases welfare by 9%.  Partial crowding out of other R&D 
assumed. 
Buonanno et al. (2003)  IAM  R&D   Induced innovation plays larger role.  Climate R&D does not crowd out other R&D. 
Gerlagh (2008)  ME  R&D 
Models clean, dirty, and neutral R&D.  Policy-induced clean R&D crowds out dirty 
R&D, enhancing the benefits of induced R&D. 
Smulders and de Nooij 
(2003) CGE  R&D 
Endogenous technological change lowers costs of energy conservation policy, but 
crowd out non-energy R&D resulting in no increase in total R&D. Energy conservation 
policy reduces net per capita income levels. 
Von Zon and Yetkiner 
(2003) ME  R&D 
Energy tax recycled as R&D subsidy promotes long term growth by induced 
technological change. 
Sue Wing (2006)  CGE  R&D 
Effect on R&D depends on substitutability between clean and dirty inputs.  The 
stringency of environmental tax affects the dirty R&D activities. With low taxes, dirty 
R&D may increase.  The higher the tax, cleaner the R&D. 
Goulder & Schneider (1999)  CGE  R&D 
Endogenous technological change lowers costs of achieving a given target, but leads to 
higher gross costs of a carbon tax. 
Nordhaus (2002)  IAM  R&D 
Substitution more important than innovation.  Assumes climate R&D crowds out other 
R&D. 
Sue Wing (2003)  CGE  R&D  Carbon tax reduces overall growth by slowing down technological change. 
Grübler and Messner (1998)  ES LBD 
Abatement activity is optimized with large abatement in earlier period and small 
abatement in later period. 
Manne and Richels (2004)  CGE/IAM  LBD 
Optimal abatement activity includes small abatement in earlier period and large 
abatement in later period. 
Goulder and Mathai (2000)  CF  LBD/R&D  LBD does not significantly affect optimizing abatement profile. 
 
Models: CGE, computable general-equilibrium model; ME, macroeconometric model; IAM, integrated assessment model; ES, disaggregated energy technology 
and system model; CF, cost-function model; IAM, integrated assessment model 
Technological Change: PI (price-induced); LBD (learning-by-doing); R&D (research and development) 
 